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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court, in a line of several cases over the past decade, has established a rigorous federal constitutional 
excessiveness review for punitive damages awards based on the Due Process Clause.  As a matter of substantive due process, 
says the Court, punitive awards must be evaluated by three “guideposts” set forth in BMW of North America v. Gore: the 
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, and a comparison 
of the amount of punitive damages to any “civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.”  
Following up on this pronouncement in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell the Court indicated that 
“few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”  Unfortunately, neither the “guideposts” nor the single-digit multiple rule have any basis in the law of due process and 
represent nothing more than the imposition of the Court’s own standards for punishment in place of those of the states.  
This Article reveals the defectiveness of this jurisprudence by exposing the absence of precedential foundation for the Court’s 
current view.  More significantly, this Article demonstrates that the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause is at odds 
with important rules of constitutional construction, mainly those supplied by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which protect 
unenumerated rights and limit the national government to exercising delegated powers, respectively.  Together, these 
amendments prohibit expansive interpretations of the Constitution that disparage rights retained by the people and that arrogate 
to the national government powers that neither the states nor the people ever relinquished.  The Court’s interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause with respect to punitive damages transgresses both of these limitations.  This Article suggests that a proper 
understanding of due process reveals that it requires only that punitive awards be reserved for wrongdoing beyond simple 
negligence, that jurors be instructed that any punitive award they impose must be designed to further states’ legitimate interest in 
punishment of in-state conduct and deterrence, and that judicial review of the awards be available to check adherence to these 
requirements.  Beyond that, the Due Process Clause fails to require that punitive damages awards be constrained to a particular 
level.
__________
“The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little 
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.”2
INTRODUCTION
Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is simple enough in its phrasing—“nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”—this 
simplicity has permitted the clause to be used (and misused)3 as a broad vessel into which many rights 
1 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.  J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Sc., London School of 
Economics; B.A., Morehouse College.  Copyright © 2005 A. Benjamin Spencer.  I am thankful to Professor Carl Tobias for 
reviewing this piece.  Many thanks also to Professors Akhil Reed Amar, Steven G. Calabresi, and Laurence H. Tribe for their 
helpful thoughts and comments on ideas contained in this Article.
2 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) .
3 See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does The Privileges Or Immunities Revival Portend The Future—Or Reveal 
The Structure Of The Present? 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 110 (1999) (describing the past century as “characterized by misguided 
efforts to ground [fundamental] rights in the concept of due process”).
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and protections have been poured.  The clause has been variously used as the source of many procedural 
protections,4 the basis for incorporating much of the Bill of Rights against the states,5 and as a source for 
unenumerated substantive rights such as the right to privacy.6 One of the recent contexts in which the 
clause has been infused with a novel and untenable interpretation is the area of punitive damages. In 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,7 the Court for the first time invalidated a punitive damages award 
on the basis of the Due Process Clause, announcing, “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.”8
However, as the Court inaugurated what it termed “the federal excessiveness inquiry,”9 it never paused to 
justify its view that the Due Process Clause places an upper limit on the amount of punitive damages 
awards.  Relying wholly on its prior case of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.10 for 
support, the Court in BMW simply declared, “Only when an award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly 
excessive’ in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”11 However, TXO itself borrowed this notion from case law that 
suggested substantive limits on civil fines and penalties, not punitive damages awards against 
4 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process requires that a hearing be held before 
public assistance payments to welfare recipients are discontinued).
5 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–148 (1968) (“The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to 
‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’  In resolving conflicting claims concerning the 
meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights 
guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7
 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
8 Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)).
9 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
10 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
11 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 454).
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tortfeasors.12 More recently, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v .Campbell13 the 
Court reaffirmed its view espoused in BMW that due process places substantive limits on the level of 
punitive damages awards and boldly pronounced that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”14
Close scrutiny of the precedential underpinnings of the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence reveals 
that far from reflecting due process limitations long thought by the Court to exist, the Court’s move to 
impose substantive limits on punitive damages via the Due Process Clause is completely unsupported by 
the Court’s prior holdings.  A review of the body of precedent relied upon by the Court in support of its 
excessiveness jurisprudence shows that the Court has misrepresented and misused the case law to lend 
legitimacy to a doctrine it has simply made up. What history and precedent indicate is that due process 
has never been construed to impair the common law practice of states permitting civil juries to award 
exemplary damages at levels they deem appropriate under the circumstances.
More significant, however, than the absence of precedential or historical support for the Court’s 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause is its complete inconsistency with certain rules of constitutional 
construction and the principles of reserved rights and limited powers embodied in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  The Ninth Amendment supplies a rule of construction that forbids 
expansive interpretations of constitutional provisions that infringe on rights retained by the people and the 
states,15 while the Tenth forbids the national government from arrogating to itself those powers not 
delegated to it but reserved to the states.16 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
12 See infra, Part II.B.4.
13
 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
14 Id. at 425.
15
 The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST., amend. IX.
16
 The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST., amend. X.
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in the BMW line of cases manages to transgress both of these limitations.  Interpreting the Due Process 
Clause in a manner that denies the right of states to empower civil juries to levy punitive awards at a level 
of their choosing exploits the Constitution’s failure to provide express protection for jury discretion in this 
area as a license to constrain it, an affront to the Ninth Amendment.  Similarly, interpreting the Due 
Process Clause in a manner that empowers the Court (or Congress)17 to substitute its common law 
preferences for those of the states ascribes power to the national government not delegated to it and 
certainly reserved to the states, offending the Tenth Amendment.
Both of these points are made especially clear in light of the Court’s determination that the Eighth 
Amendment does not pertain to punitive damages awards.18  Having failed to limit punitive damages 
awards in the very provision where one would expect such a limitation to reside—the Eighth 
Amendment—or elsewhere, the rules of construction imposed by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments do 
not leave such an important matter to esoteric implication.  Indeed, reading substantive limits on punitive 
damages into the Due Process Clause after holding that the Eighth Amendment neglects the topic violates 
two more basic rules of constitutional construction.  The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
suggests that the Eighth Amendment’s neglect of punitive damages indicates their exclusion; the rule 
against constructions that render other provisions of the Constitution redundant prevents infusing the Due 
Process Clause with a bar against punitive excessiveness when such an interpretation would make the 
Eighth Amendment unnecessary surplusage.
Although certainly many advocates of tort reform may feel that punitive damages awards are 
exorbitant and need to be limited in the manner suggested by the Court, imposing such limits is a policy 
17
 Congress has the authority, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”  U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.  Thus, presumably the Supreme Court’s declaration that excessive punitive 
damages awards violates due process would mean that Congress should have some authority to legislate in this area to prohibit 
“excessive” awards.  See infra, TAN 252–253.
18 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276–77 (1989) .
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goal that legislatures will have to achieve.19 The Supreme Court has itself expressed concern over the 
level of punitive awards20 but rather than defer to legislatures as the proper institutions for addressing this
issue, the Court has itself chosen to craft a new jurisprudence of excessiveness to achieve that end. Given 
the fabricated nature of the Court’s doctrine, one suspects that those who call for “strict constructionism” 
and deride “judicial activism” would otherwise be appalled by the Court’s actions were the Court not so 
acting for the benefit of a policy goal these same critics tend to support.21
19 See, e.g. BMW, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the “reform measures recently adopted or currently under 
consideration in legislative arenas” concerning punitive damages awards).
20 See,  e.g., Browning- Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (“Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
21
 Compare the laudatory remarks from the anti-judicial activism lobby with respect to the Court’s BMW jurisprudence to the 
outrage expressed over the Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), which was as offensive to the 
Constitution as the BMW line of cases but resulted in a policy outcome the anti-activists do not support:  the government taking 
of private property to further economic development goals of the government.  While the anti-activist Cato Institute has criticized 
the Kelo decision as a manifestation of the Court’s “complete disregard for even our explicitly enumerated rights,” Radley Balko, 
An Excess of Power, at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3974 (last visited Jan. 6, 2005), the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform—no friend of “judicial activism”—has lauded the Court’s holding in State Farm saying, 
“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court decision made great strides in providing guidelines to rein in excessive punitive damage awards,” 
Institute for Legal Reform, Issues—Punitive Damages, at http://www.institutefor legalreform.org/issues/index.php?p=punitive
(last visited Oct. 18, 2005).  The Cato Institute put out an extensive document trying to reconcile their support for the holding of 
State Farm with their opposition to judicial activism by casting the issue as follows:  “Ultimately, that determination [whether a 
punitive damages award is excessive] is up to nine justices: not by imposing their own policy preferences—that would truly be 
judicial activism—but by applying the Constitution, based on a proper theory of that document grounded in the Framers’ notions 
of limited government, separation of powers, federalism, and individual liberty.”  Robert A. Levy, Do’s and Don’ts of Tort 
Reform, at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4566 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).  Of course, the same could be said 
about the Court’s decision in Kelo, were these groups interested in defending that decision.
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Such hypocrisy22 aside, it is the task of legal scholars to hold the Court to account when legally 
untenable decisions are made, regardless of where our policy preferences may lie.  This Article 
undertakes that task.  Part I briefly lays out the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence as announced in
BMW and modified by State Farm.  Part II consists of a critique of the doctrine, finding it to be unwise as 
a matter of legal policy, at odds with the true meaning of the Due Process Clause, and unsound as a matter 
of constitutional law.    Once the doctrine has been shown to be little more than a modern creation of 
several Justices of the Court seeking to achieve certain policy objectives, Part III presents the proper 
constraints the Constitution places on the award of punitive damages.
I. THE COURT’S EXCESSIVENESS JURISPRUDENCE
There is no need to rehearse at great length the facts in the cases that underlie the Court’s 
excessiveness jurisprudence.  Others have sufficiently accomplished the task and reference to those 
resources will be adequate for readers interested in a more detailed presentation of the principal decisions 
in the BMW line of cases.23  However, the essentials of the cases underlying the doctrine and its current 
content are worth repeating here.  
22
 This hypocrisy is not unique to the punitive damages context:
Conservatives are hypocrites when it comes to federalism. On the one hand, throughout American history, they have 
advocated the need to protect and advance states’ rights. On the other hand, conservatives are quick to abandon their 
commitment to states’ rights when it gets in the way of their ideological objectives.  Just this year, a conservative Congress 
took class action suits away from the state courts and put them in federal courts because they like the results they get in federal 
courts better.  It was the most conservative wing of the Republican Party that tried to get federal courts to overrule a single 
state court’s decision in the Terri Schiavo case.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 69 (2005) (citations 
omitted).
23 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 110–129 (2005) (discussing the BMW 
line of cases from Browning-Ferris through Cooper v. Leatherman); Garrett T. Charon, Beyond a Bar of Double-Digit Ratios: 
State Farm v. Campbell's Impact on Punitive Damages Awards, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 608–616 (reviewing the BMW line of 
cases from Browning-Ferris through State Farm).
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TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.24 is the first case in which the Supreme Court 
announced that the Due Process Clause “imposes substantive limits ‘beyond which penalties may not 
go.’”25 There had been earlier attempts by litigants to use the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
excessive fines as a vehicle for imposing the very same limits on punitive damages awards but the Court 
rejected those efforts in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.26 Although the 
TXO Court indicated that such limits were to be found within the Due Process Clause, that Court did not 
invalidate the punitive damages award before it.27  That task fell to the Court only a few years later in 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.28  Citing TXO, the BMW Court reiterated that “[t]he Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment 
on a tortfeasor.”29  To determine whether the punitive damages award before it was “grossly excessive” in 
violation of due process, the BMW Court devised three “guideposts”: the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s misconduct; the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and 
the punitive damages award; and the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and 
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.30
Applying these guideposts to a $2 million dollar31 punitive damages award accompanying a 
compensatory award of $4,000, the Court in BMW invalidated the punitive damages award under review.  
The defendant’s misconduct—failing to inform a customer that the new car he purchased had been 
24 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
25 Id. at 453–54 (quoting Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)).
26 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
27 TXO, 509 U.S. at 462.
28
 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
29 Id. at 562 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 454).
30 BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
31
 The award imposed by the jury was $4 million; however, the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the punitive award down to 
$2 million in order to remove aspects of the award that reflected the jury’s use of out-of-state conduct to calculate its $4 million 
amount.  See id. at 567.
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repainted—was dismissed as “purely economic” and “not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition 
of a $2 million exemplary damages award.”32  Regarding the relationship between the punitive award and 
the harm inflicted on the plaintiff, the Court concluded that the 500 to 1 ratio was “breathtaking” and 
“raise[d] a suspicious judicial eyebrow,” placing the award beyond the acceptable range.33  Finally, the 
Court noted that the maximum criminal penalty for the defendant’s misconduct in Alabama, the plaintiff’s 
home state, would have been $2,000, with other states authorizing up to between $5,000 and $10,000, 
substantially less than the punitive award imposed here.34  From these findings the court concluded “the 
grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional limit.”35
It is important to pause here to make clear the full extent of what the Court said in BMW.  First, the 
Court affirmed that due process imposes an “excessiveness” limitation on punitive damages based on the 
logic that awards that exceed an amount needed to further a state’s legitimate interests in punishment and 
deterrence are arbitrary and therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.36  Second, the Court indicated that “a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators 
of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States,” a derivative of the 
limits on states’ sovereignty and notions of comity.37  Rather, punitive awards imposed by states “must be 
supported by the State’s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own economy,”38 although the 
Court did state that out-of-state conduct “may be relevant to the determination of the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.”39  Third, the  Court stated, “Elementary notions of fairness 
32 Id. at 576, 580.
33 Id. at 583.
34 Id. at 584.
35 Id. at 585–86.
36 Id. at 568.
37 Id. at 572.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 574 n.21.
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enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may 
impose.”40  According to the Court, it was this requirement of “fair notice” that suggested to it three 
“guideposts” as indicia of whether prospective tortfeasors would be able to foresee the magnitude of the 
sanction a state might impose for their malfeasance.  Punitive awards that go beyond a level that the 
guideposts would suggest as being foreseeable would be considered unconstitutionally excessive because 
the defendants would have lacked adequate notice that such damages could attach to their conduct.
This Article objects to the first and third of these propositions.  The Court’s second point, that a state 
may not seek to punish conduct that is lawful elsewhere, is sound because the sovereign authority of 
states does not properly extend to the punishment of lawful extraterritorial activity within our federal 
system.41  However, in BMW this principle was not implicated, because the Alabama Supreme Court 
previously had shorn the punitive damages award imposed by the jury of any elements that relied upon 
“acts that occurred in other jurisdictions.”42  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court did not (nor could it) 
invalidate the award before it on the ground that it was tainted by a reliance on lawful out-of-state 
conduct.  The first and third propositions—that the Due Process Clause bars excessive awards because 
they are arbitrary and fail to provide defendants with adequate notice of punishment—are the more 
troublesome aspects of the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence that this Article will challenge below.
40 Id. at 574.
41 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or 
property without its territory.”); id. (“The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies 
the exclusion of power from all others.”).
42 BMW, 517 U.S. at 567.  Indeed, because of this fact, Justice Scalia remarked, “The Court’s sweeping (and largely 
unsupported) statements regarding the relationship of punitive awards to lawful or unlawful out-of-state conduct are the purest 
dicta.”  Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
10 DUE PROCESS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
After BMW, the Court again faced a constitutional challenge to a punitive damages award in Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,43 although here it focused on the proper standard of 
review when considering the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.  Stating that “the level of 
punitive damages is not really a ‘fact’ ‘tried’ by the jury,” the Court held that a de novo standard was 
appropriate for reviewing punitive awards imposed by juries.44 In State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company v. Campbell,45 the Court’s most recent case in this area, the Court again invalidated a 
punitive damages award as excessive under the Due Process Clause.  This time, the punitive award was 
$145 million coupled with a $1 million compensatory award, a ratio the Court simply could not 
stomach.46  Indeed, one of the more important statements made by the Court in State Farm pertained to its 
view of the proportionality guidepost:  “[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”47
Together, these cases—in the name of the Due Process Clause—place the Court squarely in the 
position of taking a non-deferential second look at state-imposed—and Congressionally imposed48—
punitive damages awards to determine for itself whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficiently 
43
 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
44 Id. at 443.
45
 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
46 Id. at 426.
47 Id. at 425.
48
 There is nothing in the language of BMW to suggest that the Court’s interpretation of due process is limited to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Indeed, lower courts have since indicated that the due process principles espoused in BMW equally limit the federal 
government’s ability to impose punitive damages awards via the Fifth Amendment.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Howard, 24 Fed. Appx. 
480, 486 (2001) (“‘Grossly excessive’ damages awards are prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth 
Amendments.”); In re Diviney, 225 B.R. 762, 777 (10th Cir. BAP 1998) (“We are aware of recent decisions that have imposed 
some limits on punitive damage awards under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which applies only to the States but assume those limits might also be applicable under [11 U.S.C.] § 362(h) 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government.”) (citations omitted).
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reprehensible to justify a punitive award of a given amount.  Further, the Court has declared that awards 
exceeding a single-digit multiple of compensatory damages are presumptively excessive, placing 
substantial downward pressure on punitive awards before they reach the High Court for review.  The next 
Part of the Article takes issue with this doctrine.
II. A CRITIQUE
Having held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive 
damages awards,49 the Court has determined that the Due Process Clause does apply to such awards and 
that it supplies a substantive limitation on the level punitive damages awards may reach.  The sole 
question for consideration here is whether such a limitation may properly be found within the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The answer is no.  After touching on some of 
the familiar criticisms of the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence, this Part will turn to an analysis of the 
precedential underpinnings of the Court’s doctrine followed by a consideration of whether the Court’s 
interpretation of due process is consonant with basic canons of constitutional construction or with 
interpretive constraints imposed by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
A. Internal Critique
The BMW doctrine is riddled with various internal deficiencies:  its intractable subjectivity, its likely 
adverse impact on states’ policies of retribution and deterrence, and its insistence on de novo review of 
jury decisions traditionally entitled to more deferential review.  Each of these internal critiques will be 
discussed in turn.
49
 Prior to the Court’s holding in Browning-Ferris, many commentators argued that the Eighth Amendment should be read to 
apply to punitive damages awards.  See, e.g., Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment:  Application of the 
Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 667 (1988); Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages:  Some 
Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987); Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (1987); Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986).
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1. The Subjective, Takes-The-Judicial-Breath-Away-And-Raises-The-Judicial-Eyebrows Test50
A common criticism of the test created by the Court to evaluate the excessiveness of punitive 
damages awards is that the BMW guideposts fail to provide clear guidance to lower courts as to what level 
of punitive damages is appropriate.51 Justice Scalia’s dissent in the case reflected this sentiment:  “In 
truth, the ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all.”52 Justice Ginsburg 
was no more charitable in her assessment of the new guideposts in her BMW dissent:  “It has only a vague 
concept of substantive due process, a ‘raised eyebrow’ test as its ultimate guide.”53 This lack of guidance
ultimately derives from the fact that the first two guideposts consist of subjective factors that are not 
susceptible to principled application.
The first guidepost—the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct—on its face discloses 
its subjectivity by its reliance on the concept of “reprehensibility.”  Reprehensibility is by its very nature a 
subjective concept because it refers to the degree of moral opprobrium that one would affix to given 
conduct.  Such moral assessments depend heavily on the views and norms of the assessor and will vary to 
some extent from one person to another.  Although the Court purported to give additional guidance 
regarding the reprehensibility guidepost in BMW and State Farm, such guidance has failed to infuse the 
factor with sufficient objectivity:  
We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether:  the harm caused was 
physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or 
safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an 
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.54
50
 This phrase is borrowed from Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking The Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and
Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 911 (2004).
51 See e.g., Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, Punitive Damages, 117 HARV. L. REV. 317, 326 (2003) (“[D]etermining when, 
and what amount of, punitive damages are appropriate seems a subjective and fact-sensitive judgment.”).
52 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 602, 605 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53 BMW, 517 U.S. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v .Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
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These considerations are of little help in determining reprehensibility within the various categories they 
describe.  In other words, this additional guidance tells a court that wrongdoing causing physical harm is 
more reprehensible than economic harm but it does not help a court distinguish among or weigh various 
degrees of physical harm to determine the level of reprehensibility for the purposes of fixing punitive 
damages.  
A further problem with these considerations is that they involve the Supreme Court making its own 
determination on behalf of the entire nation that conduct with certain characteristics is always and in all 
circumstances more reprehensible than other conduct.  For example, the Supreme Court pronounces that 
all conduct causing physical harm is more reprehensible than all conduct causing economic harm.  But the 
nature of the harm as physical rather than economic will not always serve as an adequate proxy for 
determining relative degrees of reprehensibility.  Wrongdoing causing physical harm such as cutting 
someone with a knife or punching a person in the eye can hardly be deemed to be more reprehensible than 
or as causing the same degree of damage as massive securities fraud or other corporate wrongdoing 
costing shareholders billions of dollars, their retirement security, and their jobs.55 Additionally, 
reprehensibility often must be a localized judgment that only has meaning with reference to the standards 
of a relevant local community.  Some states may find that consumer fraud is a particularly pernicious and 
harmful offense that plagues its citizens and costs them millions of dollars annually; other states may find 
that consumer fraud really is not much of a problem, but personal property theft is.  Still other states that 
serve as major financial centers might find that they face serious wrongful conduct in the financial and 
securities area that dwarfs other wrongs in importance and reprehensibility.  The point is that it is not 
55
 The example of the Enron debacle comes to mind.  See Washingtonpost.com, The Impact at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/enron/front.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2005) (“Thousands of Enron employees
. . . were left unemployed. Enron encouraged employees to invest in the company, matched their 401(k) contributions with 
company stock, and briefly froze the plan in late October, barring employee sales, before the stock’s final plunge. Thousands of 
employees and retirees have next to nothing in their accounts.”).
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appropriate for the Supreme Court, an unelected and non-representative federal body, to pronounce and 
enforce universal, national standards of reprehensibility binding upon the states.
The second guidepost—the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff 
and the punitive damages award—is subjective on two counts.  First, when identifying the magnitude of 
any disparity a court has to assess the degree of potential harm and compare that with the punitive award; 
this is a somewhat discretionary assessment that is subject to some manipulability.56 How can potential 
harm be measured with any degree of precision?  What assumptions should be made; should judges 
assume a worst case scenario?  Second, once a disparity is quantified, the guidepost calls for a subjective 
judgment regarding whether that disparity is inappropriate under the circumstances of the case. Is a 
disparity of 20-to-1 too great?  How is a court to make such a determination? Although the Court has 
indicated that punitive-to-compensatory damages ratios greater than 9-to-1 will rarely be warranted,57
absent a bright-line rule imposing such a fixed upper limit lower courts are left to figure out for 
themselves whether a given disparity is “excessive” without being given any objective standards for doing 
so.  
The ultimate assessment made by the Court in BMW and State Farm—that the given punitive 
damages awards were of an amount greater than that needed to achieve the state’s legitimate goals of 
deterrence and retribution and greater than that warranted by the reprehensibility of the defendants’ 
actions—is wholly subjective.58  There is no objective means of determining whether a lower award 
56 See Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road For Evaluating Punitive Damages: Lifting The Haze From
The BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 441, 469 (2004) (“For example, the ratio in TXO has been described 
as being both 526 to 1 (when considering the punitive damages award to the actual compensatory damages) and as not more than 
10 to 1 (when considering the punitive damages award to the potential compensatory damages if the tortious plan had succeeded). 
Thus, the reliability and usefulness of the second guidepost is questionable.”).
57 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
58
 One scholar, in defending the holding of BMW, attempted to explain why BMW’s actions in BMW were not sufficiently 
egregious to warrant the resulting punitive award but ultimately did nothing more than convey his personal view that the wrong 
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would indeed achieve the same level of deterrence as the award actually imposed.  Similarly, whether a 
state’s goals in punishment or retribution are vindicated by a lower amount is not an objective matter; 
indeed, by imposing and approving a higher award the state has already indicated its view that a lower 
award would not sufficiently further its interest in retribution.  Thus, the Court’s imposition of its own 
view of the matter is no more than a subjective difference of opinion, with the Court having the power to 
have its view control.59 This sad state of affairs makes Justice Scalia’s comment in his BMW dissent quite 
apt: “[T]he application of the Court’s new rule of constitutional law is constrained by no principle other 
than the Justices’ subjective assessment of the ‘reasonableness’ of the award in relation to the conduct for 
which it was assessed.”60  With subjective assessments holding sway over the Court’s BMW analysis, the 
Court has created a constitutional law of punitive damages that brings about the very arbitrariness that the 
Court has sought to combat.  As Justice Scalia recently remarked in another context, “a test . . . that has 
no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively be shown to have been met or 
failed” is no more than “a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven 
done was slight.  See Zipursky supra, note 23 at 168 –69 (“[I]t seems to me . . . that Gore did not really have a particularly serious 
grievance against BMW . . . . [I]n light of the relatively minor fraudulent concealment, the grievance legitimately held against 
BMW by Gore is quite paltry . . . . [I]t is preposterous that the grievance associated with this transaction was anywhere near the 
size that a jury would have believed warranted personal redress of $2 million.”) (emphasis added).  Well, that is just one man’s 
opinion.  Clearly the jury and state judiciary in BMW felt differently and the question is the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court 
to second-guess that judgment.
59 The Court acknowledged as much in a different context when it rejected a constitutional proportionality principle for 
reviewing criminal sentences under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (“The real function of a constitutional proportionality principle, if it exists, is to enable judges to 
evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men and women has considered proportionate—and to say that it is not.   For that 
real-world enterprise, the standards seem so inadequate that the proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of 
subjective values.”). 
60
 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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decisionmaking.”61  Thus, beyond being ill-founded and constitutionally untenable (defects of the 
doctrine to be addressed below), the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence is subjective to the point of 
rendering federal punitive damages review arbitrary and unpredictable.
2. The Problem with Proportionality
The Court’s recourse to a proportionality principle as a means of assessing the excessiveness of 
punitive damages awards is additionally problematic because the magnitude of harm inflicted on plaintiffs 
is not the proper measure of the reprehensibility of a wrongdoer’s actions.  There is no clear reason why 
the magnitude of actual or potential harm bears the most relevance to the reprehensibility of conduct; the 
degree of harm caused or potentially caused can depend on a host of factors having nothing to do with 
reprehensibility.  For example, the pre-existing condition of a victim can affect whether a given act 
inflicts minor harm or major damage; unpredictable market forces can determine whether securities fraud 
results in huge profits or major losses for investors; insurance coverage can reduce the harm one suffers 
compared with harm that is not mitigated by such coverage; acts of God such as severe weather can bring 
about more harmful consequences than the same conduct may have caused under better conditions; or 
simple chance events can mean the difference between a minor car accident and a fatal one. Further, as 
one commentator has noted, quite reprehensible actions can have minimal harmful effects while wholly 
accidental conduct can lead to disastrous results, further attenuating the connection between resultant 
harm and reprehensibility:
[I]f the purpose of punitive damages is to deter behavior that is morally reprehensible, the relevance of the compensatory 
loss is not immediately evident unless an intent to affect the magnitude of loss was a specific element of the reprehensible 
action. Many totally inadvertent or accidental actions generate huge loss; many repugnant and reprehensible actions 
generate little harm, measured solely in compensatory lost income, needed expense, and pain and suffering.62
When evaluating punitive damages, what matters more than the magnitude of the harm to the plaintiff 
is the level of insult to the public.  Punitive da mages represent the imposition of a penalty by the state 
61
 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. REV. 838 (1996).
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against wrongdoers in an effort to express the community’s level of disapproval of the unlawful conduct 
and to punish the wrongdoer accordingly.  Thus, the proper measure of punitive damages awards is this 
level of public outrage—which can only properly be pronounced by state legislatures and civil juries—not 
the degree of private harm.  Indeed, the Court long ago recognized that punitive damages are not properly 
measured by their proportion to the degree of harm inflicted on the victim when it wrote:
Nor does giving the penalty to the aggrieved [party] require that it be confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as 
it is imposed as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the Legislature may adjust its amount to the public wrong 
rather than the private injury, just as if it were going to the state.63
Because it is the public wrong rather than private injury that is being punished, there is no good reason to 
exalt proportionality to compensatory damages as the principal measuring rod of excessiveness.  
Beyond being an inappropriate yardstick of reprehensibility, the Court’s proportionality principle 
detracts from the legitimate goals of punishment and deterrence that the Court has indicated states have a 
right to pursue.64 A strict proportionality principle—particularly one biased against awards exceeding 
single-digit multiples—can result in punitive awards too meager in size to deter well-heeled prospective 
tortfeasors from engaging in similar wrongdoing.  An insufficiently substantial penalty will be viewed 
simply as a tolerable cost of a certain course of action, provided the ultimate benefits to be gained 
outweigh that cost.65 Two commentators have expressed this point in economic terms:
63 St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919).  See also id. (“When the penalty is contrasted with the 
overcharge possible in any instance it of course seems large, but, as we have said, its validity is not to be tested in that way.
When it is considered with due regard for the interests of the public . . . we think it properly cannot be said to be so severe and 
oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.”).
64 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing 
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”).
65
 Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations On Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won't Be The Last Word, 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 779, 808 (2004) (“An amount that might be sufficient to deter a less wealthy defendant could very well be written off as 
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The magnitude of the effect on the firm’s production activities and its choice of inputs necessarily depend on the firm’s 
production budget and financial status of the firm[;] the wealthier the firm or greater its ability to pay, the smaller the effect.  
Accordingly, one of the dominant factors any court should consider when reviewing the award of punitive damages is the 
financial position of the firm, i.e. its isocost function (or production cost budget).  The extent to which a firm is “willing to 
pay” the punitive price for reprehensible production activities is a function of the firm's isoquant and isocost functions.  To 
ignore these individual-specific functional relationships renders the stated purposes of punitive damages, i.e. punishment 
and deterrence, meaningless.”66
Economic realities mean that punitive damages must take into account the wealth of the defendant if 
states are to have any hope of achieving their retributive and deterrent goals when dealing with defendants 
of greater means.67
Referring to the tortfeasor’s financial position in fixing punitive damages is not a foreign concept to 
the Court.  Prior to BMW and State Farm the Court had endorsed the proposition that a defendant’s 
wealth properly figured in an evaluation of the propriety of a punitive damages award.68 However, the 
simply a cost of doing business by a much wealthier corporation, undermining the achievement of the deterrence goals of 
punitive damages.”).
66 Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court's Reasonable Relationship Test:  
Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 237, 256 (2005).
67
 Professors Rustad and Koenig usefully provided a historical perspective on this point, highlighting the ancient Roman 
practice of exemplary damages and its justification:
The Roman law of multiple damages blended compensation with punishment. The Twelve Tables dating from 450 B.C. 
contained numerous examples of multiple damages. One commentator noted the need for Roman multiple damages to 
constrain wealthy elites: 
“The laws of the XII Tables declared that whoever should do a personal injury to another should pay twenty-five asses, a 
considerable sum at the time. At a later time, however, when money abounded, this penalty became so insignificant that one 
Lucius Veratius used to amuse himself by striking those whom he met in the streets in the face, and then tendering them the 
legal amends, from a wallet which a slave carried after him for the purpose.”
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity Of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming The Tort Reformers, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285–86 (1993) (quoting Vindictive Damages, 4 AM. L.J. 61, 75 (1852) ).
68 See, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“The punitive damages award in this case is certainly large, but in 
light of the . . . petitioner’s wealth, we are not persuaded that the award is so ‘grossly excessive’ as to be beyond the power of the
State to allow.”) (citation omitted); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21– 22  (1991) (approving the use of the 
“defendant's financial position” as one criterion in determining whether a punitive award is excessive) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
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strict proportionality principle announced by the Court does not account for the need to tailor punitive 
damages to the financial condition of the defendant (and prospective wrongdoers) to achieve the desired
level of punishment and deterrence.  Thus, the Court’s move towards requiring a reasonable relationship 
between punitive damages and compensatory damages undermines the ability of the punitive damages to 
achieve their intended purpose.
3. Unjustified De Novo Review
A final point worth mentioning is that the Court’s determination that its excessiveness review must be 
conducted de novo69 permits the complete second-guessing of factual determinations made by the jury.
Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court was already doing this in BMW:
The Court distinguishes today’s result from Haslip and TXO partly on the ground that “the record in this case discloses no 
deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive, such as were 
present in Haslip and TXO.”  This seemingly rejects the findings necessarily made by the jury—that petitioner had 
committed a fraud that was gross, oppressive, or malicious.70
Reaching the conclusion that the facts do not support malevolence on the part of the defendant after the 
jury has considered the evidence and reached a contrary conclusion improperly permits the Supreme 
Court to weigh the evidence and reexamine factual determinations, violates the spirit if not the letter of 
the Seventh Amendment.71
Additionally, de novo review not only invades the traditional province of civil juries, but it invades 
the traditional province of states.  As discussed in greater detail below, fixing appropriate levels of 
punishment for violations of state laws are state powers not delegated to the national government.  The 
Court seemed to affirm this notion in State Farm when it wrote, “[E]ach State alone can determine what 
69 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
70 BMW, 517 U.S. at 606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71
 The Seventh Amendment provides, “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.”  U.S. CONST., amend. VII (emphasis added).
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measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”72  However, it 
is unclear how de novo review of factual determinations made by juries respects state authority in this 
area when it allows the Court to substitute its own measure of punishment for that of the states.73
In sum, the Court’s excessiveness review—which consists of a de novo review using the BMW 
guideposts, a review heavily shaped by a single-digit multiple proportionality requirement—is fraught 
with hopeless subjectivity, is poorly connected to the goals of punishment and deterrence, and enables the 
Court to engage in unwarranted review of factual judgments made by state courts and juries. In the 
sections that follow, this Article will explore the deeper doctrinal difficulties with the Court’s 
excessiveness jurisprudence that go beyond the internal problems discussed above.
B. An Absence of Precedent
More serious than the doctrine’s shortcomings from a policy perspective is the fact that the Supreme 
Court lacked any precedential basis for its determination in TXO and BMW that the Due Process Clause 
imposes substantive limitations on the amount of punitive damages awards. Although the Court has 
considerable authority to declare the meaning of constitutional provisions, it has presented its 
excessiveness jurisprudence as if it were firmly and deeply rooted in prior case law in which the Court 
pronounced and adhered to a doctrine that punitive damages may not rise beyond a certain level in light of 
due process.74  This, however, is simply not the case.  Scrutiny of the collection of cases on which the 
Court has purported to base its doctrine reveals a total absence of precedential support for the notion of 
72 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
73 BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no precedential warrant for giving our judgment priority over the 
judgment of state courts and juries on this matter.”).
74 See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–5 4 (1993):
[S]everal of our opinions have stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits 
“beyond which penalties may not go.”  Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78, 28 S.Ct. 28, 30, 52 L.Ed. 108 
(1907).   See also St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67, 40 S.Ct. 71, 73, 64 L.Ed. 139 (1919);  Standard 
Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286, 32 S.Ct. 406, 411, 56 L.Ed. 760 (1912). Moreover, in Southwestern Telegraph
& Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 35 S.Ct. 886, 59 L.Ed. 1419 (1915), the Court actually set aside a penalty imposed 
on a telephone company on the ground that it was so “plainly arbitrary and oppressive” as to violate the Due Process Clause.  
Id., at 491, 35 S.Ct., at 888. In an earlier case the Court had stated that it would not review state action fixing the penalties for 
unlawful conduct unless “the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due 
process of law.”  Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111, 29 S.Ct. 220, 227, 53 L.Ed. 417 (1909).
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due process limitations on the amount of punitive damages that states may impose.  Indeed, such a review 
makes plain that the Court’s position is not the product of reason and sound constitutional analysis, but 
rather is a modern creation falsely clothed in the cover of precedent.
1. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw75
The road to BMW was short, spanning less than a decade.  However, in just that brief period the Court 
was able to spin out of thin air an entire jurisprudence of excessiveness—based on the Due Process 
Clause—and present it as if it had always been there.  In no case prior to 1988 did any member of the 
court express through an opinion the idea that due process placed substantive limits on the amount of 
punitive damages.  In that year, however, in Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,76 the Court 
faced a challenge to a punitive damages award based on the Due Process Clause.  Although the Court 
rejected the challenge because it had not been raised and considered in the lower courts,77 Justice 
O’Connor seized the opportunity to pen a concurrence that laid the groundwork for the Court’s ultimate 
embrace of substantive due process limitations on punitive damages awards.
Justice O’Connor’s principal concern was the authority of juries under the Mississippi law at issue “to 
award any amount of punitive damages in any tort case in which a defendant acts with a certain mental 
state.”78 Justice O’Connor noted, “Punitive damages are not measured against actual injury, so there is no 
objective standard that limits their amount.”79  Because of the lack of any objective constraints, Justice 
O’Connor worried that “the impact of these windfall recoveries is unpredictable and potentially 
75 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 76 (“We conclude, however, that these claims were not raised and passed upon in state court, and we decline to reach 
them here.”).
78 Id. at 87 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
79 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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substantial.”80  For that reason, she wrote, “the Court should scrutinize carefully the procedures under 
which punitive damages are awarded in civil lawsuits.”81 Because under the Mississippi law “the amount 
of the penalty that may ensue is left completely indeterminate,” and, according to the Mississippi 
Supreme Court, “the determination of the amount of punitive damages is a matter committed solely to the 
authority and discretion of the jury,” Justice O’Connor mused, “This grant of wholly standardless 
discretion to determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due process.”82
Although Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that “the procedures under which punitive damages are 
awarded” deserved scrutiny is certainly correct, her further suggestion that the jury’s unfettered discretion 
in setting the amount of such awards “appears” contrary to due process is off the mark.  One finds no 
citations in support of Justice O’Connor’s claim regarding the purported affront to due process worked by 
such jury discretion because no Supreme Court precedent supports such a view.  To the contrary, as an 
analysis of all the relevant cases below demonstrates, the Court had historically and continually affirmed 
the fact of jury discretion in this area without ever suggesting any due process limits on the amounts that 
juries could award.
2. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.83
The next case in which the Court faced a due process challenge to a punitive damages award was 
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,84 where the Court again declined to 
consider the issue because it was not properly preserved.85  In doing so, Justice Blackmun, the author of 
80 Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 87 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Electrical Workers 
v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 88 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
82 Id.
83 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 277.
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the majority opinion, did take the opportunity to note that the question was one the Court had never 
addressed:  
There is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil 
damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme, see, e.g., St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 
(1919), but we have never addressed the precise question presented here:  whether due process acts as a check on undue jury 
discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit.86
But Justice Blackmun declined to opine on the matter and simply wrote, “That inquiry must await another 
day.”87  The award was also challenged as excessive under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, but the Court held the clause to be inapplicable to punitive damages awards.88
Unfortunately, other Justices of the Court were not so reticent.  In a concurrence, Justice Brennan, 
joined by Justice Marshall, took the opportunity to promote his view that the Due Process Clause does 
impose substantive limits on the amount of punitive damages a jury may award.  However, unlike Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Bankers Life, Justice Brennan attempted to support his view with precedent 
stretching back to the turn of the last century:
Several of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible civil damages that may be awarded to a 
private litigant, the Due Process Clause forbids damages awards that are “grossly excessive,” Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.  
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909), or “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously 
unreasonable,” St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919).   See also Southwestern Telegraph & 
Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 522–523 (1885).89
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan’s effort to gin up a pedigree for his proposition ultimately fails upon 
scrutiny of his citations. Waters-Pierce provides no support for the proposition that due process forbids 
“grossly excessive” punitive damages awards because it was a case addressing the propriety of a civil 
86 Id. at 276–77.
87 Id. at 277.
88 Id. at 260.
89 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280– 81 (1989)  (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted).
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penalty referred to as a “fine” by the Court, not punitive damages.90  Furthermore, the case that the 
Waters-Pierce Court cites in support of its “grossly excessive” language, Coffey v. Harlan County,91 also
was addressing the propriety of a criminal fine and a Fourteenth amendment challenge to it based on a 
claim of having been deprived an opportunity to be heard, not based on the fine being excessive.92
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams,93 the case next case cited by Justice Brennan, was addressing 
itself to a civil penalty as well rather than punitive damages; however, in this case the penalty was made 
payable to the aggrieved private party rather than the state.94  Although such an arrangement renders the 
payment akin to punitive damages, the Williams Court wrote, “The provision assailed is essentially penal” 
and “the power of the state to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is 
coeval with government.”95  Having styled the penalty as “penal,” the Court indicated the following 
relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and a state’s power to impose penal sanctions:
That this clause [the Due Process Clause] places a limitation upon the power of the states to prescribe penalties for 
violations of their laws has been fully recognized, but always with the express or tacit qualification that the states still 
possess a wide latitude of discretion in the matter, and that their enactments transcend the limitation [only where the penalty 
prescribed is] so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable. Coffey v. 
Harlan County, 204 U. S. 659, 662 [1907]; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 78 [1907]; Waters-pierce Oil 
Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 111 [1909]; Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502, 510 [1915].96
Clearly, given the Court’s determination in Williams that the penalty at issue was “penal,” the Court here 
is referring to limits on penal sanctions imposed by states, something today’s Court would view as 
90 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 96 (1909) (noting that the underlying action was a “prosecution . . . brought by 
the attorney general of Texas and the county attorney of Travis county, to recover penalties, under the act of [May 25] 1899 . . . at 
the rate of $5,000 per day, and under the act of 1903 . . . at the rate of $50 per day”).
91 204 U. S. 659 (1907).
92 Id. at 663 (“The plaintiff contends that the sentence awarded against Whitney violated this prohibition, in that Whitney had 
no opportunity to be heard upon and defend against that part of the sentence which imposed a fine and authorized a judgment 
against his estate for its collection.”).
93 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
94 Id. at 66.
95 Id. (quoting Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 523 (1885))
96 Id. at 66–67.
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deriving from the protections of the Eighth Amendment as incorporated against the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  That the Court is discussing limits on criminal penalties is 
confirmed when one consults the sources cited by the Court.  Coffey and Waters-Pierce were criminal and 
civil fine cases,97 Collins was a case dealing with a criminal sentence of imprisonment,98 and Seaboard
dealt with a civil penalty similar to that at issue in St. Louis.99  Thus, St. Louis should be seen as an 
excessive fines case rather than a punitive damages case.
Moving to the third in Justice Brennan’s series of citations, Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. 
v. Danaher100 hardly provides the “See also” support that Justice Brennan advertises.  In Danaher, the 
defendant telephone company was held liable for $6,300 in civil penalties as a result of failing to provide 
service to a customer in violation of a state statute mandating the delivery of service.101  The telephone 
company challenged the penalty because they were denying service pursuant to an impartially imposed 
regulation that denied service to all customers with delinquencies, a regulation that state law arguably 
permitted the company to impose.102 In assessing the challenge to the civil penalty, the Court wrote as 
follows:
There was no intentional wrongdoing, no departure from any prescribed or known standard of action, and no reckless 
conduct.  Some regulation establishing a mode of inducing prompt payment of the monthly rentals was necessary . . . . The 
protection of its own revenues and justice to its paying patrons required that something be done.  It acted by adopting the 
regulation and then impartially enforcing it.  There was no mode of judicially testing the regulation’s reasonableness in 
advance of acting under it, and, as we have seen, it had the support of repeated adjudications in other jurisdictions.  In these 
97 See supra TAN 90–92.
98 237 U. S. 502, 510 (1915) (“It is contended that a sentence of fourteen years’ imprisonment for the crime of perjury is 
grossly excessive, and therefore illegal, and prohibited by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”).
99
 207 U.S. 73, 76 (1907) (“Failure to adjust and pay such claim within the periods respectively herein prescribed shall subject 
each common carrier so failing to a penalty of $50 for each and every such failure, to be recovered by any consignee or 
consignees aggrieved, in any court of competent jurisdiction.”).
100 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
101 Id. at 485.
102 Id. at 486–87.
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circumstances to inflict upon the company penalties aggregating $6,300 was so plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to be 
nothing short of a taking of its property without due process of law.103
So we can see that Danaher does not support the notion that the Due Process Clause imposes substantive 
limits on the amount of punitive damages states may award.  Rather, the case holds that it is “arbitrary 
and oppressive” to impose civil penalties on a company that has not engaged in intentional wrongdoing or 
reckless conduct but rather has acted in a way it had reason to believe was permissible.
Justice Brennan’s final case, Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes,104 offers the least support for the 
claim that due process limits the amount of punitive damages.  In Humes Justice Field contradicts that 
claim when he writes:
“The law,” says Sedgwick, in his excellent treatise on Damages, “permits the jury to give what it terms punitory, vindictive, 
or exemplary damages; in other words, blends together the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual, and gives 
damages, not only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the offender.”  The discretion of the jury in such cases is not 
controlled by any very definite rules.105
Justice Field actually confirms that jury discretion in this area is unconstrained, the opposite of what 
Justice Brennan is asserting. Further, earlier in his opinion Justice Field stated that the Due Process 
Clause affords no vehicle for challenging “the harshness, injustice, and oppressive character” of laws
provided that they are enacted within the legitimate sphere of the state’s power and enforced consistent 
with certain procedural protections.106  Thus, Humes can hardly be used to support the idea that the Due 
Process Clause prohibits “excessive” punitive damages awards.
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion in Browning-Ferris in which she dissented from the Court’s 
holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to punitive damages 
103 Id. at 490–91.
104 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
105 Humes, 115 U.S. at 521.
106 Id. at 520 (“If the laws enacted by a state be within the legitimate sphere of legislative power, and their enforcement be 
attended with the observance of those general rules which our system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private 
rights, the harshness, injustice, and oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate them as affecting life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”).
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awards.107  However, before providing her analysis of the Eighth Amendment issue, Justice O’Connor 
reiterated her views expressed in Bankers Life and took time to make several observations about the 
harmful effects skyrocketing punitive damages were having on our economy:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.   As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed 
by an appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000.   Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been 
sustained on appeal.  The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new 
products.   Some manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability 
than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market.  Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been 
forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive damages.108
As I discuss further below,109 these policy concerns are more appropriate for legislative consideration and 
have no bearing on the existence of constitutional limitations on punitive damages awards.  However, 
these concerns ultimately seem to be what compelled the Court to embrace such limits in BMW.
Beyond sowing seeds of discontent through her litany of policy concerns, Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
was also pivotal in the pre-BMW line of cases because her discussion of how she would apply the 
Excessive Fines Clause to the review of punitive damages awards reveals the source of the three 
“guideposts” the Court ultimately adopted.  The following passage, in which Justice O’Connor suggests a 
framework for evaluating punitive damages awards under the Eighth Amendment is remarkable for the 
degree to which it prefigures the guideposts analysis the Court announces in BMW:
Determining whether a particular award of punitive damages is excessive is not an easy task.   The proportionality 
framework that the Court has adopted under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, however, offers some broad 
guidelines.   See Solem, 463 U.S., at 290-292, 103 S.Ct., at 3009-3011. Cf. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 
(CA9 1987) (applying Solem factors to civil forfeiture under RICO).   I would adapt the Solem framework to punitive 
damages in the following manner. First, the reviewing court must accord “substantial deference” to legislative judgments 
concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.   Second, the court should examine the gravity of the defendant’s 
conduct and the harshness of the award of punitive damages.   Third, because punitive damages are penal in nature, the court 
should compare the civil and criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for different types of conduct, and the civil 
and criminal penalties imposed by different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct.110
107 492 U.S. 257, 283 (1989) .
108 Id. at 282.
109 See infra, Part II.C.2.
110 Id. at 300–01.
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It is apparent that the BMW guideposts—which assess the reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, 
the proportional relationship between harm and the punitive award, and the difference between the 
punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable 
cases—derive much of their content from this adaptation of the Solem framework.
In sum, in Browning-Ferris members of the Court alluded to a vague notion that due process 
substantively limits punitive damages awards but they each failed to identify any precedent that truly 
stands for that principle.
3. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip111
Two years after Browning-Ferris in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip112 the Court revisited 
the issue of whether the Due Process Clause imposes limitations on the amount of punitive damages. In 
Haslip Justice Blackmun, author of the Browning-Ferris opinion, further laid the groundwork for the 
BMW decision when he listed a catalogue of cases that he claimed evinced the Court’s awareness of and 
ultimate concern about the potential constitutional infirmities of excessive punitive awards.113  Although 
Justice Blackmun concludes, in light of the cases he cites, that “The constitutional status of punitive 
damages, therefore, is not an issue that is new to this Court or unanticipated by it,” reference to the cited 
cases reveals that the constitutional status of punitive damages was raised in none of them.  The first of 
these cases, Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,114 simply held that punitive damages were not recoverable 
111 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
112 Id.
113 See id. at 12 (citing the following cases as indicative of a recognition of the presence of questions surrounding the 
constitutional status of punitive damages:  Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270–71, (1981); Electrical Workers v. 
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50–51 (1979);  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 
U.S. 29, 82–84, (1971) (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting);  Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 351 
(1913);  Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915);  St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. 
Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919)).
114 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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against a municipality in a section 1983 suit.115  In the process of arriving at that conclusion, the Court 
had the following to say about punitive damages:
The Court has remarked elsewhere on the broad discretion traditionally accorded to juries in assessing the amount of 
punitive damages. Because evidence of a tortfeasor’s wealth is traditionally admissible as a measure of the amount of 
punitive damages that should be awarded, the unlimited taxing power of a municipality may have a prejudicial impact on the 
jury, in effect encouraging it to impose a sizable award. The impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be both 
unpredictable and, at times, substantial, and we are sensitive to the possible strain on local treasuries and therefore on 
services available to the public at large.  Absent a compelling reason for approving such an award, not present here, we 
deem it unwise to inflict the risk.116
This passage, which is the one cited by Justice Blackmun, hardly raises any issue pertaining to the 
constitutional status of punitive damages.  To the contrary, the Court here affirms that juries have “broad 
discretion . . . in assessing the amount of punitive damages” and thus acknowledges that a punitive award 
could be both “unpredictable” and “substantial.”  No judicial eyebrow is raised here nor is there any hint 
that such jury authority is improper.
Justice Blackmun’s next case, Electrical Workers v. Foust,117 held that punitive damages may not be 
assessed against a union that breaches its duty of fair representation by failing properly to pursue a 
grievance.118  In explaining its rationale, the Court made no allusions to constitutional concerns with 
punitive damages; rather, the Court relied upon the established fact that punitive damages could be 
unforeseeably large to reach its holding that as a policy matter, allowing unions in such situations to face 
punitive damages was unwise: 
Just as unlimited access to the grievance process could undermine collective bargaining, so too the threat of punitive 
damages could disrupt the responsible decisionmaking essential to peaceful labor relations. In order to protect against a 
future punitive award of unforeseeable magnitude, unions might feel compelled to process frivolous claims or resist fair 
settlements. Indeed, even those unions confident that most juries would hold in their favor could be deterred by the 
possibility of punitive damages from taking actions clearly in the interest of union members. Absent clear congressional 
guidance, we decline to inject such an element of uncertainty into union decisions regarding their representative functions.119
115 Id. at 271.
116 Id. at 270–71.
117 442 U.S. 42, (1979).
118 Id. at 52.
119 Id. at 50– 51.
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Again, the case here acknowledges the “unforeseeable magnitude” of punitive awards without 
condemning them or suggesting that any condemnation is warranted.
The next case in Justice Blackmun’s string of citations is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,120 a case that, 
just like those discussed above, affirms rather than challenges the authority of juries to award substantial 
punitive damages without substantive constitutional constraints.   In Gertz the Court held that States may 
not permit recovery of punitive damages from publishers or broadcasters for libel or slander when 
liability is not based on showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.121  Justice 
Blackmun’s quotation from the case comes from the following passage:
We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under 
state-defined standards of liability for defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited 
only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable 
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to 
punish expressions of unpopular views.  Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages 
unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly 
irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation 
for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future 
occurrence. In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that 
stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.
Certainly, this language admits of no belief or suggestion that substantive constitutional limits on punitive 
damages exist.  Indeed, as in the cases discussed above, the Court remarks on the discretion of juries in 
the area of punitive damages as an established and uncontroversial fact, not as a circumstance potentially 
at odds with the Court’s constitutional sensibilities.
Next from Justice Blackmun we have a dissent by Justice Marshall in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc.,122 in which Justice Marshall expresses his concern about the impact on freedom of the press of 
permitting punitive damages awards to be imposed against media defendants alleged to have committed 
defamation.  Justice Marshall’s discussion of punitive damages was as follows:
The concept of punitive or exemplary damages was first articulated in Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng.Rep. 768 
(K.B. 1763)—one of the general warrant cases.  There Lord Camden found that the power to award such damages was 
inherent in the jury’s exercise of uncontrolled discretion in the awarding of damages.  Today these damages are rationalized 
as a way to punish the wrongdoer and to admonish others not to err. Thus they serve the same function as criminal penalties 
120 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
121 Id. at 350.
122 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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and are in effect private fines. Unlike criminal penalties, however, punitive damages are not awarded within discernible 
limits but can be awarded in almost any amount. Since there is not even an attempt to offset any palpable loss and since 
these damages are the direct product of the ancient theory of unlimited jury discretion, the only limit placed on the jury in 
awarding punitive damages is that the damages not be “excessive,” and in some jurisdictions, that they bear some 
relationship to the amount of compensatory damages awarded. The manner in which unlimited discretion may be exercised 
is plainly unpredictable.  And fear of the extensive awards that may be given under the doctrine must necessarily produce 
the impingement on freedom of the press recognized in New York Times.123
Justice Marshall here makes no mention of constitutional limits on punitive damages.  Rather, he affirms 
the longstanding view that jury discretion in this area is “unlimited” and that punitive damages “can be 
awarded in almost any amount.”124 There is no indication that the limit against excessiveness he mentions 
is rooted in federal constitutional principles but is more likely a reference to the limits traditionally 
imposed by the states themselves.
The remaining cases in Justice Blackmun’s list are equally unavailing.  Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. 
Tucker,125 addresses a fixed civil penalty imposed on common carriers for charging fees in excess of 
statutorily prescribed amounts, not the authority of juries to impose punitive or exemplary damages upon 
tortfeasors.  Thus, although the Court struck down the award as “arbitrary and oppressive,” it was  
deemed “arbitrary” because its predetermined and fixed amount ($500) had nothing to do with the actual 
overage in any particular case, and “oppressive” because the pricing regime penalized carriers for 
violating a price structure they otherwise had no prior opportunity to contest.126 Southwestern Telegraph 
& Telephone Co. v. Danaher127 and St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams,128 the final cases suggested by 
Justice Blackmun, have already been discussed above and as shown, provide no indication that 
substantive constitutional limitations constrain punitive damages awards.129
123 Id. at 82–83 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
124 Id.
125 230 U.S. 340 (1913).
126 Id. at 351.
127
 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
128 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
129 See supra TAN 93–103.
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Having introduced the Court’s “experience” with this issue by reference to the cases just reviewed, 
Justice Blackmun in Haslip declares, “One must concede that unlimited jury discretion—or unlimited 
judicial discretion for that matter—in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar 
one’s constitutional sensibilities.”130  Only Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1),131 is cited for this 
proposition, a case already shown to address civil fines, not punitive damage awards.132  Fortunately, 
Justice Blackmun largely confined his constitutional thoughts to a concern with whether the procedures
for imposing punitive damages under the Alabama statute at issue sufficiently guided juror discretion 
rather than with whether the amount that the jury awarded was excessive.  Unfortunately, however, at the 
end of his opinion, Justice Blackmun referred to the fact that the punitive award was “4 times the amount 
of compensatory damages” and suggested that such an award was “close to the line” but did not “cross the 
line into the area of constitutional impropriety.”133  The “line” that Justice Blackmun alludes to is of his 
own invention; he cites no authority for the concept nor does any authority earlier in the opinion suggest 
the existence of such a line.  Nonetheless, this “line” is one of the seeds of the BMW/State Farm
doctrine.134
130 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111 
(1909)).
131
 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
132 See supra TAN 90–92.
133 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23–24.
134
 Although Justice O’Connor wrote a dissent in Haslip, it was on the basis of her belief that the procedures of the Alabama 
statute at issue were totally insufficient because they gave the jury vague insufficient guidance for the exercise of its discretion:  
“Alabama’s common-law scheme for awarding punitive damages provides a jury with such skeletal guidance that it invites—
even requires—arbitrary results. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 63 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Her prior arguments regarding 
substantive upper limits were not featured; rather, her dissent highlighted void for vagueness arguments and an argument under 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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4. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.135
By the time the Court decided the next in the line of cases leading up to BMW, TXO Production 
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,136 a majority of Justices had signed on to the proposition that due 
process imposes levels beyond which punitive damages may not go.  Justice Stevens, in an opinion 
commanding the support of three other justices, asserted that “grossly excessive” punitive damages 
awards amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law.’”137  For this principle he cited 
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1),138 again a civil fine (not punitive damages) case that in turn cites 
Coffey v. Harlan County,139 a criminal fine case. As should be clear by now, neither Waters-Pierce nor 
Coffey in any way make or support the claim that the Due Process Clause prohibits “grossly excessive” 
punitive damages awards.
Beyond Waters-Pierce, Justice Stevens cites several other cases to support the notion that “the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits ‘beyond which penalties may 
not go.’”140 These cases are unavailing, however, because they are basically the same cases cited by 
advocates of this view in the earlier pre-BMW cases just discussed.  For example, Justice Stevens cites 
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers,141 which dealt with a $50 civil fine imposed on common carriers 
who failed to pay damages to claimants within a specified period after being held liable for the 
damages.142 Another case Justice Stevens cites, Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri,143 also offers no 
135 509 U.S. 443 (1993) .
136 509 U.S. 443 (1993) .
137 TXO, 509 U.S. at 454.
138 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909).
139 204 U. S. 659 (1907).
140 TXO, 509 U.S. at 453–454 (quoting Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)). 
141 207 U.S. 73 (1907).
142 Id. at 78.
143 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
34 DUE PROCESS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
support for the view that the Due Process Clause places substantive limitations on the amount of punitive 
damages.  Rather, the case addresses a state-imposed fine and the obligation of states not to impose 
“excessive fines.”144 In short, Justice Stevens provides no precedential support for what now stands as a 
majority view in favor of substantive due process limitations on punitive damages.  Nonetheless, his 
opinion became the cornerstone of the Court’s subsequent opinion invalidating the punitive damages 
award in BMW, where the Court relied exclusively on TXO and its antecedents for support for its 
inauguration of federal excessiveness review.145
This analysis of the relevant cases leading up to BMW and their purported turn-of-the-century 
antecedents reveals that the precedential foundation for the Court’s pronouncement that “The Due Process 
Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from imposing ‘grossly excessive’ punishments on 
tortfeasors”146 is virtually non-existent.147  Far from evincing a long-standing view of the substantive 
limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause, the handful of continually-cited precedents only give us 
insight into the Court’s treatment of criminal and civil fines or other “penal” sanctions.148  Extrapolating 
from such cases to divine a substantive limit on punitive damages awarded in tort cases is an untenable 
step, particularly in light of the court’s determination that punitive damages are not sufficiently “penal” or 
fine-like to fall within the protection of the Eighth Amendment.  Given that the Court’s prior cases do not 
144 Id. at 286.  St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919) and Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. 
Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915), cases that were already discussed at supra TAN 93–103 round out Justice Stevens list of citations.
145 See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State 
from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.”) (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 
509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (and cases cited)). 
146 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001).
147 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]the only authority for the Court’s position is simply not 
authoritative.  These cases fall far short of what is needed to supplant this country’s longstanding practice regarding exemplary 
awards.”).
148
 Justice Scalia goes further in his critique by charging that these cases “simply fabricated the ‘substantive due process’ right 
at issue”).  Id. at 601.
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provide support for the Court’s current interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the next section 
considers whether the Court nonetheless has interpreted the Clause in a manner consistent with its text, 
history, and original meaning.
C. Subjective Due Process
Shorn from its purported precedential underpinnings, the Court’s federal excessiveness jurisprudence 
must be justified on its own terms as sound constitutional doctrine.  However, when one analyzes the 
Court’s view of the relationship between the Due Process Clause and punitive damages, it becomes clear 
that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution in this context is not consonant with the any understood 
meaning of the phrase “due process of law.”
1. The True Meaning of Due Process
The antecedent of the phrase “due process of law” is the phrase “per legem terrae” or “law of the 
land,” which originates from the Magna Carta.149 The Court has long understood this core phrase, “law of 
the land” and its descendant “due process of law,” as protecting the citizenry against arbitrary exercises of 
governmental power:
In England the requirement of due process of law, in cases where life, liberty and property were affected, was originally 
designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the crown, and to place him under the protection of the law.  
The words were held to be the equivalent of “law of the land.”  And a similar purpose must be ascribed to them when 
applied to a legislative body in this country; that is, that they are intended, in addition to other guaranties of private rights, to 
give increased security against the arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, and the arbitrary spoliation of property.150
Although this protection initially stood as a guard only against the excesses of the federal government via 
the Fifth Amendment, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment enshrined a protection against arbitrary 
149 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1856) (“The words, ‘due process of law,’ were 
undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna Charta.”).  See also Walker v. 
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1876) (Due process of law is process due according to the law of the land.); Edward S. Corwin, The 
Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911) (tracing the origins of the phrase “due 
process of law” to the Magna Carta).
150 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885).  See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 
(1998) (“We have emphasized time and again that “‘[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against 
arbitrary action of government.’”) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
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exercises of power by the state governments.  In both contexts, the Due Process Clause requires that 
governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property be effected pursuant to validly enacted laws151 and 
obligates the government to provide those procedures that have long been held to be fundamental to 
ensuring that such deprivations are fundamentally fair152 and non-arbitrary:  notice and the opportunity to 
be heard153 and the right to an impartial decisionmaker154 that decides matters on the basis of information 
presented to it.155  Additionally, in the Fourteenth Amendment context the Due Process Clause has been 
interpreted to mean that state governments would have to afford citizens most of the rights given to 
151 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 24–25 (1997) (“Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be 
taken; even life can be taken; but not without the process that our traditions require—notably, a validly enacted law and a fair 
trial.”); Corwin, supra note 149 at 372 (describing early state interpretations of the phrase “by the law of the land” as meaning by 
“a law for the people . . . made or adopted by themselves by the intervention of their own legislature”).
152
 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (“Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of 
governmental activity.”).
153 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required 
before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. . . . The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity 
to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”) (citation omitted); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause 
but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded 
by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”).
154
 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 178 (1994) (“A necessary component of a fair trial is an impartial judge.”) (citation 
omitted).
155
 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).  The particulars of these requirements have been held depend on the level of 
procedural protection appropriate given the circumstances, something that is determined with reference to a three-factor test 
articulated by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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national citizens in the Bill of Rights to the extent that such rights were deemed to be critical components 
of fundamental fairness.156
The Court has indicated, however, that “[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair 
process.”157  Thus, “substantive due process” rights have been determined to exist as well, even though 
they may find no place within the Bill of Rights.158  As the Court has explained, “It is a promise of the 
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter,” and this realm 
constitutes a “substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”159  The limits of 
this sphere are amorphous but discernible; as the second Justice Harlan explained:
156 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–148 (1968) (“The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to 
‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’  In resolving conflicting claims concerning the 
meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights 
guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  Professor Tribe has argued that the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
against the states should more properly have been done via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Tribe, 
supra note 3 at 184 (“In reality, it would accord fully with the history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and a sensible 
reading of its language to make it, rather than the Due Process Clause, the basic vehicle for selective incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights against the states.”).  The Privileges or Immunities Clause reads, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  U.S. CONST., amend XIV, sec. 1.
157 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).  See also Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) 
(stating that the Due Process Clause “protects individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of 
the procedures used to implement them”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
158
 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (“It is tempting, as a means of 
curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the 
individual against federal interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution.  But of course 
this Court has never accepted that view.”) (citation omitted).
159 Id. at 847, 848.  One might plausibly trace substantive due process doctrine at least back to the now repudiated case of 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the Court indicated, “The general right to make a contract in relation to his 
business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”  Id. at 53.  See 
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[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of 
the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This “liberty” is not a series of isolated points pricked out in 
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from 
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and 
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment.160
Among the liberty interests deemed to fall within this sphere of substantive due process protection include 
the right to marry,161 have children,162 direct their education,163 use contraception,164 and refuse unwanted 
medical treatment.165
The Court has made it clear that although substantive due process protects a range of unenumerated 
rights,166 the concept must not be treated as unrestricted and used expansively.  To the contrary, the Court 
is to tread carefully in determining that a particular right warrants inclusion within this protective sphere:
David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner And The Origins Of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 
GEO. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2003) (“Lochner was the progenitor of modern substantive due process cases such as Griswold v.
Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas.”).  Professor Tribe has suggested that various substantive liberty interests 
essential to being “a self-governing person” might plausibly fit within the privileges and immunities of Americans, thus 
warranting protection through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Due Process 
Clause.  See Tribe, supra note 3 at 188–191.  See also id. at 194 (“[U]se of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a less 
troublesome vehicle both for selective incorporation and for the elaboration of whatever unenumerated rights merit protection 
against the states”).
160 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).
161
 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
162 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
163 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
164 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
165 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
166
 This is not a non-controversial proposition.  Justice Scalia had the following to say about the idea that due process protects 
unenumerated substantive liberties:
My favorite example of a departure from text—and certainly the departure that has enabled judges to do more freewheeling 
lawmaking than any other—pertains to the Due Process Clause . . . . It has been interpreted to prevent the government from 
taking away certain liberties beyond those . . . that are specifically named in the Constitution.  Well, it may or may not be a 
good thing to guarantee additional liberties, but the Due Process Clause quite obviously does not bear that interpretation.
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[W]e have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.  By extending constitutional protection to an asserted 
right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.   We 
must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.167
To forestall the unwarranted expansion of substantive due process, the Court has determined that 
protection is only appropriate for “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”168  Thus, the Court has said, “Our Nation’s 
history, legal traditions, and practices . . . provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.”169
Beyond the well-established procedural guarantees and traditional substantive liberties discussed 
above, text, history, and precedent do not reveal additional protections provided by the right to “due 
process.”  Early after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment many litigants mistakenly took the phrase 
“due process of law” to provide a mechanism for propagating challenges to lower court judgments on the 
generalized ground that the result was “harsh” or “unjust,” notwithstanding the fact that such challengers 
had been afforded sufficient notice, hearing, and other protections:
But, from the number of instances in which these words are invoked to set aside the legislation of the states, there is 
abundant evidence . . . “that there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision, as found in the 
fourteenth amendment.”  It seems . . . to be looked upon “as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the 
abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court of the justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of 
the legislation on which such a decision may be founded.”
This language was used in 1877, and now, after the lapse of eight years, it may be repeated with an expression of increased 
surprise at the continued misconception of the purpose of the provision.170
Scalia, supra note 151 at 24 (emphasis in original).  It is beyond the scope of this Article to quarrel with the notion of substantive 
due process and I thus decline to do so here.
167 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
168 Id. at 720–21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
169 Id. at 721 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
170 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519–20 (1885) (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 
(1877)).
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In an effort to make clear the scope of protection that the Due Process Clause provides, Justice Field, the 
author of the opinion just quoted, wrote:
If the laws enacted by a state be within the legitimate sphere of legislative power, and their enforcement be attended with the 
observance of those general rules which our system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights, the 
harshness, injustice, and oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate them as affecting life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.171
From this statement we find the sum total of what due process means in our federal system under the 
Fourteenth Amendment:  it obligates states to follow general procedural rules that provide security of 
private rights—notice, hearing, an impartial decisionmaker and the like—and it constrains states from 
acting beyond their “legitimate sphere of legislative power,” both limitations that keep states from 
exercising their power arbitrarily or in a way that infringes upon traditionally held substantive liberty 
interests.  What due process does not guarantee under this framework is that the law or its application will 
not produce harsh, unjust, or oppressive results.  Protection against such evils must be accomplished by 
other means designed to impose limitations on what the government can do.  Thus, for example, the 
Eighth Amendment creates a express prohibition against punishments that are unduly harsh because they 
are “excessive” or “cruel and unusual,”172 creating a substantive right that governments in this country 
may not transgress.  In short, due process protects procedural fairness and fundamental liberty interests 
but fails itself to proscribe any harsh or oppressive outcomes a fair process may generate.
2. Policy over Law
The Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause as providing a substantive limit beyond which 
punitive damages may not go strays well beyond the boundaries of due process doctrine as heretofore 
delineated by the Court and briefly sketched out above.  The Court has couched its excessiveness 
jurisprudence in the language of procedural due process—indicating that the BMW guideposts are 
necessary to provide defendants with “fair notice” of the severity of potential punishment and to prevent 
171 Humes, 115 U.S. at 520.
172 U.S. CONST., amend VIII.
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arbitrary punishment from being imposed—dutifully “mouth[ing] a couple of buzzwords from standard 
due process jargon.”173 However, the doctrine cannot plausibly claim to derive from the Court’s 
traditional view of those concepts.  
It may be true that parties should have notice that certain conduct may subject them to a certain 
degree of punishment; however, that in no way translates into a constitutionally-imposed maximum level 
beyond which punitive damages may go.  Rather, it means that prospective tortfeasors must be aware, ex 
ante, that their wrongful conduct will subject them to punitive damages of a level deemed appropriate by 
a jury of their peers, with jurors measuring propriety with reference to the state’s legitimate goals of 
punishment and deterrence.  That the jury’s discretion is constrained only in that its award must be limited 
to an amount sufficient to achieve punishment and deterrence rather than to any fixed dollar amount may 
render prospective punishment potentially harsh, but does not implicate the defendant’s right to notice.  
To paraphrase Justice Field’s remarks in Humes, the “harshness, injustice, and oppressive” nature of a 
punitive damages award is not a violation of due process so long as it is imposed “with the observance of 
those general rules which our system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights.”174
Similarly, defendants should indeed be protected from arbitrary punitive damages awards; but again, 
the need to prevent arbitrary awards does not warrant the establishment of a constitutional damages cap.  
Rather, an interest in avoiding arbitrary awards justifies policing of the procedures under which states 
impose punitive damages awards and the standards in place to guide and constrain jurors’ discretion in 
this area.  Punitive awards that flow from juries attentive to the need to limit damages to an amount 
sufficient to punish and deter, and subject to state court appellate review for compliance with such 
strictures are not arbitrary but to the contrary, reflect a state’s considered judgment that punitive awards 
of a given amount are appropriate.
173 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 767 (1999).
174 Humes, 115 U.S. at 520.
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Notwithstanding, then, the Court’s rhetoric of procedural due process, one could more properly 
classify the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence as having identified a substantive due process right 
against a “grossly excessive” punitive damages award.175  However, given the Court’s statements 
regarding the nature and limits of substantive due process and the history and tradition—endorsed by the 
Court—of unconstrained state jury authority over punitive damages, the Court’s excessiveness 
jurisprudence is an inappropriate expansion creating a new right that due process was never meant to 
comprehend.  Justice Marshall’s comments on behalf of the Court regarding the traditional understanding 
of punitive damages bear repeating here:
The concept of punitive or exemplary damages was first articulated in Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng.Rep. 768 (K.B. 
1763)—one of the general warrant cases.  There Lord Camden found that the power to award such damages was inherent in 
the jury’s exercise of uncontrolled discretion in the awarding of damages.  Today these damages are rationalized as a way to 
punish the wrongdoer and to admonish others not to err. Thus they serve the same function as criminal penalties and are in 
effect private fines. Unlike criminal penalties, however, punitive damages are not awarded within discernible limits but can 
be awarded in almost any amount.176
Although Justice Marshall went on to indicate that states have imposed excessiveness or proportionality 
limitations on the amount of punitive damages as is their right, he made no mention of federal 
constitutional constraints on the amount of such awards.  As can be seen, then, it is clear that states 
traditionally have been unconstrained in their ability to award punitive damages.
Thus, the new due process right against excessive punitive damages that the Court has created is 
clearly not one of “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed,” as the Court has indicated a right must be to be counted 
among those protected by substantive due process.177  Perhaps had the Court determined that the Founders 
included punitive damages awards within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause it 
would be possible to argue that a deep tradition against the excessiveness of such awards has long existed.  
175 BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing as one of “[t]he most significant aspects of [the BMW] decision” 
as “the identification of a ‘substantive due process ’ right against a ‘grossly excessive’ award).
176 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82– 83 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
177 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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However, because the Court itself has indicated that the Founders’ decision to omit mention of punitive 
damages from the Eighth Amendment was deliberate and evinced an intent not to limit punitive damages 
awards,178 it is more accurate to say that history and tradition reveal the absence of a deeply-rooted 
principle against excessive punitive damages awards.
Not fitting neatly within its own procedural or substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court’s 
excessiveness doctrine might rightly be seen as a manifestation of what I call subjective due process:  a 
jurisprudence of substantive legal protections imposed by the Court in the name of due process that have
a basis only in the subjective policy interests of their proponents on the Court.179 Justice Black was an 
early opponent of subjective due process jurisprudence.  On several occasions he commented on the 
difficulty with the Court’s practice of invoking “natural law” or “fundamental principles of liberty” as the 
basis for the articulation of various rights or, more problematically, as the basis for the invalidation of 
legislative actions:
This decision reasserts a constitutional theory . . . that this Court is endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under 
“natural law” periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court’s conception of what at a 
particular time constitutes “civilized decency” and “fundamental principles of liberty and justice.”
. . .
178 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 273 (1989) (“[T]he Framers of the Eighth 
Amendment did not expressly intend it to apply to damages awards made by civil juries.”). 
179
 Others have aptly noted how the Court’s creation of a substantive due process right against excessive punitive damages 
awards harkens back to widely repudiated Lochnerism.  See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 23 at162 (describing the BMW doctrine as 
“an amorphous due process constraint perilously close to delegitimated Lochner precedents”); Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and 
Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. High Tech. L. 79, 95 (2005) (“Permitting federal appeals judges to determine for 
themselves the amount of punitive damages . . . ‘would be Lochnerism on a massive scale.’”) (quoting Alan Howard Scheiner, 
Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, The Seventh Amendment, And The Politics Of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 
182 (1991)).  On the Court’s rejection of Lochnerian economic substantive due process, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 
730–31 (1963) (“We emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts ‘used the Due Process Clause to strike down state 
laws, regulatory of business or industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought.’”) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
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[T]he “natural law” theory of the Constitution . . . degrade[s] the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and 
simultaneously appropriate[s] for this Court a broad power which we are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise.180
Writing in dissent in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View,181 Justice Black lashed out at the 
Court’s lurch towards a subjective due process by writing:
The Wisconsin law is said to violate the “fundamental principles of due process.” Of course the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment contains no words that indicate that this Court has power to play so fast and loose with state laws.  
The arguments the Court makes to reach what I consider to be its unconstitutional conclusion, however, show why it strikes 
down this state law. It is because it considers a garnishment law of this kind to be bad state policy, a judgment I think the 
state legislature, not this Court, has power to make . . . . There is not one word in our Federal Constitution or in any of its 
Amendments and not a word in the reports of that document’s passage from which one can draw the slightest inference that 
we have authority thus to try to supplement or strike down the State’s selection of its own policies. The Wisconsin law is 
simply nullified by this Court as though the Court had been granted a super-legislative power to step in and frustrate policies 
of States adopted by their own elected legislatures.182
Justice Black’s description of the Court’s excesses in Sniadach is apt here; the Court has appointed 
itself as a super-legislature with the power to supplant state choices regarding appropriate levels of 
punitive damages with the Court’s own view.  Indeed, what ultimately has happened here is that Justice 
O’Connor’s (along with Justice Stevens’) policy views regarding the excessiveness of punitive 
damages—which she initially attempted to vindicate through the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause183—have been embraced by the Court in the name of due process. As Justice O’Connor wrote in 
Browning-Ferris:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.   As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed 
by an appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000.   Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been 
sustained on appeal.  The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new 
products.   Some manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability 
than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market.  Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been 
forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive damages.184
180 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69– 70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
181 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
182 Id. at 34 (Black, J., dissenting).
183 See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 297 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In my view, the $6 
million award of punitive damages imposed on BFI constitutes a fine subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment.”).
184 Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
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Justice Blackmun expressed similar concern on behalf of the Court when he wrote, “We note once again 
our concern about punitive damages that ‘run wild.’”185
But Justice Scalia had it right when he responded, “Since the Constitution does not make that concern
any of our business, the Court’s activities in this area are an unjustified incursion into the province of 
state governments.”186  Setting punitive damages policy is not within the purview of the Court.  As the 
Court itself has readily acknowledged, judgments about the propriety of a particular punishment for a 
given offense are legislative rather than judicial determinations.187  Given that states through their 
legislatures, courts, and juries have always enjoyed unconstrained authority over the imposition of 
punitive damages awards provided that procedural due process requirements are honored, there is no 
warrant for holding that there is a fundamental liberty interest, protected by substantive due process, in 
having punitive damages not exceed a particular amount.  In insisting that due process supplies and 
protects such an interest, the Court is not interpreting the Due Process Clause, but rewriting it.188 If, as 
the Court once remarked, the Necessary and Proper Clause is “the last, best hope of those who defend 
ultra vires congressional action,”189 then the Due Process Clause has become the last, best hope of those 
who defend ultra vires judicial regulation.  Without respect for the intended confines of the Due Process 
Clause, or the principles of federalism protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,190 the Due Process 
185 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
186 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“[J]udgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense 
belong in the first instance to the legislature.”); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views may be 
entertained regarding severity of punishment, . . . these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy”).
188 Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2236 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Federal power expands, but never contracts, 
with each new locution.  The majority is not interpreting the Commerce Clause, but rewriting it.”).
189 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
190 See infra, Part II.D.2.
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Clause, like the Necessary and Proper Clause, “will always be a back door for unconstitutional federal 
regulation.”191
D. An Impermissible Construction of the Constitution
In view of the fact that the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause vis-à-vis punitive 
damages is not supported by the language or historical meaning of the phrase “due process of law,” the 
only remaining question is whether the Court nonetheless may construe the Clause as it has simply by 
virtue of its status as the ultimate arbiter of what the Constitution means.192  Although the Court’s 
interpretive authority over the Constitution is supreme, it is not unlimited.  Various canons of 
constitutional construction—such as the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one 
thing is the exclusion of another)—serve at least as nominal or presumptive bounds on how the Court 
may interpret the document.193  More forcefully, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution 
combine to place strict limits on the construction the Court may give to provisions of the Constitution.
The Court may not construe a provision to deny the people rights they have retained simply because those 
retained rights are not specifically enumerated.194  Neither may the Court interpret the Constitution in a 
way that vests the national government with powers not delegated to it but reserved to the states.195 The 
Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause as supplying substantive limits on the amount of punitive 
damages that state juries may award not only violates certain canons of constitutional construction, but it 
191 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”).
193 See, e.g., Meyers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 237 (1926) (opinion of McReynolds, J.) (“[T]he Constitution must be interpreted by 
attributing to its words the meaning which they bore at the time of its adoption, and in view of commonly-accepted canons of 
construction, its history, early and long-continued practices under it, and relevant opinions of this court.”).
194
 The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST., amend. IX.
195
 The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST., amend. X.
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is deeply at odds with the limited federal form of government that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments  were 
meant to protect.
The Constitution was not meant to supplant state sovereignty with that of a national government; 
rather, the Constitution was crafted to unite the states into a Union that could achieve certain national 
ends while the states retained many (if not most) of the essential aspects of their separate existence.  
Justice Nelson aptly encapsulated this point during an extensive discussion of state sovereignty in 
Collector v. Day:196
It is a familiar rule of construction of the Constitution of the Union, that the sovereign powers vested in the State 
governments by their respective constitutions, remained unaltered and unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the 
government of the United States.  That the intention of the framers of the Constitution in this respect might not be 
misunderstood, this rule of interpretation is expressly declared in the tenth article of the amendments, namely:  “The powers 
not delegated to the United States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  The government of the United 
States, therefore, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must 
be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.197
Thus, although the federal government was delegated certain powers when the Union was formed, the 
Tenth Amendment indicates that states were left free to perform those functions they had always 
performed—such as exercising their police powers198 and providing for the adjudication of disputes in 
196
 78 U.S. 113 (1870).
197 Id. at 125.  See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (explaining that federal-state comity means “a proper respect 
for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a 
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform 
their separate functions in their separate ways”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“The several States of the Union are 
not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in 
the government created by the Constitution.  But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise 
the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them.”).
198 U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (“[T]he Constitution reserves the general police power to the States.”).  See 
also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (“The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and 
comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.”).
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their own courts199—provided the powers were “not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States.”200
In view of this relationship between states and the national government, the Court rightly indicated in 
Erie v. Tompkins201 that the national government is not empowered to develop and impose common law 
rules that would be applicable within and across all of the states:
There is no federal general common law.  Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a 
state whether they be local in their nature or “general,” be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.  And no clause 
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.202
To the contrary, the common law traditions of states remained in tact under the Constitution.  Nothing in 
the main text of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights purported to impair the ability of states to continue 
to follow their common law traditions both with respect to the formulation of substantive legal principles 
and with respect to principles concerning the judicial process and remedies. Indeed, as Justice Field 
explained long before the Court adopted its view in Erie, the Constitution not only fails to impair state 
power over state common law but it stands as an affirmative bar, or “perpetual protest,” against such a 
notion:
[T]he general law of the country . . . has been often advanced in judicial opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of 
a state. . . . But, . . . there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the constitution of the United States, which
recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the states. . . . Supervision over either the legislative or the 
judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specially authorized or 
delegated to the United States.  Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the 
state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.203
199 See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 126 (1870) (“We have said that one of the reserved powers was that to establish a 
judicial department; it would have been more accurate, and in accordance with the existing state of things at the time, to have said 
the power to maintain a judicial department. All of the thirteen States were in the possession of this power, and had exercised it 
at the adoption of the Constitution; and it is not pretended that any grant of it to the general government is found in that 
instrument.”).
200 U.S. CONST., amend. X.
201
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
202 See id. at 78.
203 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)
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A longstanding element of states’ common law authority has been their power to empanel juries and 
impose punitive damages awards in appropriate cases.  The Supreme Court made this clear long ago in 
Day v. Woodworth204 when it wrote:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury 
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his 
offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.  We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been 
questioned by some writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best 
exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument.  By the common as well as by statute law, men are 
often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action, and the damages, inflicted by way of 
penalty or punishment, given to the party injured.205
Indeed, beyond the power to impose such damages it has been equally acknowledged that the amount of 
punitive damages awards under the common law has always been for the jury to determine.206  More 
recently and consistent with principles articulated in Erie, the Court acknowledged that crafting standards 
of excessiveness for punitive damages awards is a matter of state common law:
Although petitioners and their amici would like us to craft some common-law standard of excessiveness that relies on 
notions of proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages, or makes reference to statutory penalties for similar 
conduct, these are matters of state, and not federal, common law.   Adopting a rule along the lines petitioners suggest would 
require us to ignore the distinction between the state-law and federal-law issues.   For obvious reasons we decline that 
invitation.207
Having established that states and their citizens retained the right and authority to impose, through 
juries, punitive damages awards at a level of their choosing, constrained only by notions of excessiveness 
devised and imposed by the states themselves, the question is whether the Constitution, via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, can be read to have imposed substantive federal constraints in this area as identified by the 
Court.  The most likely candidate for such a constraint would have been the Eighth Amendment’s 
204 54 U.S. 363 (1852).
205 Id. at 371 (emphasis added).  See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In 
1868 . . . when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, punitive damages were undoubtedly an established part of the American 
common law of torts.”).
206 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“[N]othing is better settled than that ... it is the peculiar function of the jury to 
determine the amount [of punitive damages] by their verdict.”). See also Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 
(1885) (“The discretion of the jury in such cases is not controlled by any very definite rules”).
207 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989).
50 DUE PROCESS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
prohibition against excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, given the amendment’s concern with 
the substantive degree of punitive sanctions.208  However, the Court has declared that the Eighth 
Amendment cannot be read to apply to punitive damages awards because in its view, the amendment was 
intended to apply only to direct actions initiated by government to inflict punishment, not “to awards of 
punitive damages in cases between private parties.”209
Because it rejected recourse to the Eighth Amendment as a source for a substantive limitation on 
punitive damages, the Court was left with no other constitutional provisions that addressed the issue on 
their face.  Nonetheless, the Court identified the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
constitutional provision that supplies the very limitation it determined that the Eighth Amendment failed 
to provide.  But this use of the Due Process Clause is untenable both as a matter of the basic canons of 
constitutional construction and as a matter of federalism as protected by the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments. 
1. Canons of Constitutional Construction
Two canons of constitutional construction are violated by the Court’s interpretation of due process:  
expressio unius est exclusio alterius210 and the rule against constructions that render other provisions of 
208
 The Eighth Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
209 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260.
210 See, e.g., Homes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 591 (1840) (opinion of Barbour, J.) (“[A]s the Constitution contains several 
express prohibitions upon the states, from the exercise of powers granted to the federal government; if we were to apply to its 
construction the maxim so well founded in reason, expressio unius, est exclusio alterius, it would seem to lead to the conclusion 
that all the powers were expressly prohibited which were intended to be prohibited.”).  Justice Thomas explained this maxim in 
the context of qualifications for Representatives when he wrote, “‘[f]rom the very nature of such a provision, the affirmation of 
these qualifications would seem to imply a negative of all others.”  This argument rests on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius. When the Framers decided which qualifications to include in the Constitution, they also decided not to include any other 
qualifications in the Constitution.”  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 868 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 624 (1833)).
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the Constitution redundant surplusage.211  The Court relied on the former canon when it held that the 
Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damages awards:
But the practice of awarding damages far in excess of actual compensation for quantifiable injuries was well recognized at 
the time the Framers produced the Eighth Amendment.   Awards of double or treble damages authorized by statute date back 
to the 13th century, and the doctrine was expressly recognized in cases as early as 1763. Despite this recognition of civil 
exemplary damages as punitive in nature, the Eighth Amendment did not expressly include it within its scope.   Rather, as 
we earlier have noted, the text of the Amendment points to an intent to deal only with the prosecutorial powers of 
government.212
In other words, given the Framers’ familiarity with punitive damages, if they wanted the Eighth 
Amendment to apply to punitive damages awards, they would have said so.
If, as the Court has held, the Framers’ familiarity with punitive damages awards and their failure to 
include them within the Eighth Amendment’s express terms means that the amendment does not pertain 
to such awards, the same reasoning requires the conclusion that the Framers’ failure to mention punitive 
damages awards anywhere in the Constitution suggests that no substantive limits on punitive damages 
were intended at all.  Put differently, the Court’s expressio unius reasoning applies not only to the Eighth 
Amendment itself, but to the whole of the Bill of Rights.  Such reasoning is consistent with that endorsed
by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist; in providing an example of the “proper use and true meaning” 
of the expressio unius maxim in the context of constitutional interpretation, Hamilton wrote the 
following:
The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress . . . shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This 
specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative authority, because an affirmative grant 
of special powers would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority was intended. 
In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the Constitution to comprehend certain cases 
particularly specified.  The expression of those cases marks the precise limits, beyond which the federal courts cannot 
extend their jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification would be nugatory if it 
did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.213
211
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without 
meaning, if such is to be the construction. . . . It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without 
effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”).
212 Id. at 274–75.
213 See The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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In like manner, by expressly indicating limitations on certain types of judicial impositions (bail, fines, and 
punishments) but failing to mention others of which the Founders were well aware (compensatory and 
exemplary damages), one cannot plausibly read into the Due Process Clause a limitation on punitive 
damages the Founders failed to mention.
Additionally, where the limitation at issue is of particular importance—as would be the case with the 
imposition of a theretofore non-existent constraint on the discretion of juries—the restriction cannot 
properly be left to implication where other limitations of a similar kind are expressly mentioned. James 
Madison articulated just such a rule of interpretation that can help reveal the impropriety of the Court’s 
current course.  In his speech against a bill proposing that the United States incorporate a national bank, 
Madison suggested several rules of constitutional interpretation; the fourth among these was as follows:  
“In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the degree of its incidentality to an express 
authority, is to be regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend the probability 
or improbability of its being left to construction.”214  What Madison means here is that the more important 
the authority at issue, the less likely it is that the framers of the Constitution would have left the matter to 
interpretation, speculation, or conjecture;215 “Thus, if it is not expressly listed in the Constitution, the 
omission likely was intentional.”216 Had the Founders intended to limit punitive damages awards granted 
in civil cases in the same manner that they limited fines and punishments imposed in actions initiated by 
214 Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 Documentary History of the First Federal 
Congress, 1789–1791, at 369 (William Charles DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995).  For the curious, the other three rules 
Madison presented were as follows:  “An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the government cannot be just”; 
“In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide”; 
and  “Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning of the parties.”  Id.
215 Cf. Scalia, supra note 151 at 29 ([S]ince congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity is such an extraordinary act, 
one would normally expect it to be expclicitly decreed rather than offhandedly implied—so something like a ‘clear statement’ 
rule is merely normal interpretation.”).
216
 Kurt Lash, Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 387 (2004).
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the government, “it cannot be that they would not have explicitly said so.”217  It makes little sense to say 
that the Founders clearly omitted exemplary damages when they wrote the Eighth Amendment but 
intended them to be covered by implication elsewhere.
One might certainly suggest that applying expressio unius reasoning to conclude that a right against 
excessive punitive damages is not present in the Constitution runs counter to the command of the Ninth 
Amendment that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people.”218  The problem with such an argument, however, would be 
the fact that history fails to disclose any pre-constitutional protection against excessive punitive damages 
awards that one could purport had been “retained”.  On the contrary, history reveals that the pre-
constitutional state of affairs was unfettered jury discretion over such awards,219 a power that the 
Constitution would have to expressly constrain to reach it, given the requirements of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.220
The Court’s interpretation of due process as including a prohibition against excessive punitive 
damages awards also violates the canon against constructions that render other constitutional provisions 
redundant.  If it is the case that the Due Process Clause—both in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—
imposes substantive limitations against excessive punitive damages awards, then the clause must also 
impose limitations against excessive fines and punishments in actions initiated by the government.  The 
rationale behind the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence respecting punitive damages and respecting 
217
 Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. 666, 674–75 (1873) (“The case as to the constitution is a proper one for the application of the 
maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The instrument is drawn with ability, care, and fulness [sic] of details.  If those 
who framed it had intended to forbid the granting of such aid by the municipal corporations of the State, as well as by the State 
itself, it cannot be that they would not have explicitly said so.”).
218 U.S. CONST., amend. IX.
219 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82–83 (1971)  (Marshall, J., dissenting) (acknowledging a long-
standing tradition of unlimited jury discretion).
220 See infra, Part II.D.2 for a discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
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fines and criminal punishments is the same, and the Court has treated the limitations in both spheres as 
related variants of a unified doctrine, notwithstanding their nominally distinct textual bases.221 But if this 
is so, the Eighth Amendment, at least to the extent it prohibits excessive penal sanctions,222 is redundant.
Indeed, this is the very point raised by Justice Scalia in his dissent in TXO:  
It is particularly difficult to imagine that “due process” contains the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive 
punitive damages, since if it contains that it would surely also contain the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive 
fines, which would make the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment superfluous in light of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”223
What is the purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment if the Due Process just as 
ably accomplishes the same thing?  The Excessive Fines Clause becomes surplusage once the Court’s 
interpretation is accepted because there is no plausible way to hold that due process limits the 
excessiveness of punitive damages awards but provides no similar guard against the excessiveness of 
other punitive sanctions. The more defensible interpretation would be that the Eighth Amendment’s 
explicit mention of the matter of punitive excessiveness indicates that it is the sole source for substantive 
221
 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), the Court discussed its excessiveness 
jurisprudence for the two different spheres as if they were one and the same, conceding only that different texts provide authority 
for the doctrines:
Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion.   
That Clause makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments applicable 
to the States.  The Due Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from imposing ‘grossly excessive’ 
punishments on tortfeasors.
Id. at 433–44 (citations omitted).  The Court went on to discuss the rationale underlying its excessiveness doctrines in an 
integrated fashion without distinguishing between the doctrine as it applied to punitive damages awards versus fines and criminal 
punishments.  See, e.g., id. at 434 (stating, “In these cases, the constitutional violations were predicated on judicial determinations 
that the punishments were ‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of . . . defendant[s’] offense[s],’” and citing both to criminal and 
civil cases).
222
 One can only speculate whether the Court, absent the Eighth Amendment, would read into the Due Process Clause a bar 
against “cruel and unusual” punishment.
223 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 471 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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limits in this sphere, and that its failure to include punitive damages within its coverage means that the 
Constitution fails to concern itself with the excessiveness of such awards.
Professor Benjamin Zipursky attempts to address this issue by affirming the Court’s exclusion of 
civilly-imposed punitive damages from the criminally-concerned Eighth Amendment but arguing that the 
“criminal or quasi-criminal idea” embedded “American punitive damages law today” warrants the “the 
recognition of an Eighth Amendment right, applied through the Due Process Clause,” to be protected 
against excessive punitive damages awards.224 In other words, there are novel quasi-criminal aspects of 
punitive damages awards—absent in the traditional common law model—that justify heightened 
constitutional scrutiny.225 One problem with this argument is that it is unclear how the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment independently carries out this duty apart from mere incorporation of 
the Eighth Amendment against the States; there is no particular reason why these asserted quasi-criminal 
aspects of punitive damages call for due process protection against excessive awards rather than Eighth 
Amendment protection.226
Another problem with this argument is that even if there is a novel “quasi-criminal” aspect to some 
modern-day punitive awards, Professor Zipursky concedes that this has been the case “for the past several 
decades,”227 a time period within which the Court has considered and rejected the applicability of the 
224 Zipursky, supra note 23 at 165.
225 See id. at 166 (“[T]he problem does not lie in the very idea of punitive damages at the common law, but in a particular 
direction that punitive damages in tort law has, as it turns out, developed.”).
226
 Although Zipursky does allude to concerns about the vagueness of penalty guidelines and the absence of criminal 
procedural safeguards that could implicate procedural due process concerns, see id. at 163, he fails to connect these issues either 
to the resulting substantive cap that the Court has sought fit to impose or to his own theory that it is the current criminal or quasi-
criminal tenor of punitive damages awards that implicates heightened constitutional scrutiny.  His quasi-criminal tenor point only 
carries weight if the argument is that the Excessive Fines Clause should apply to punitive damages and does nothing to support 
the existence of a procedural or due process right to a substantive cap on punitive awards.
227 Id. at 170.
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Excessive Fines Clause to modern punitive damages awards.228  Thus, even if there were plausible 
arguments for why punitive damages today have characteristics that render them amenable to regulation 
under the Excessive Fines Clause229 (notwithstanding the fact that such damages may not have been seen 
as being within the clause when it was promulgated), those arguments have not been accepted by the 
Court.  As a result, absent a direct challenge to the Court’s holding of Browning-Ferris—something 
Professor Zipursky does not attempt or suggest—we must accept it.  Doing so forecloses recourse to the 
Eighth Amendment for any justification of the Court’s BMW jurisprudence and leaves us with fact that 
discovering an anti-excessiveness principle in the Due Process Clause renders the Excessive Fines Clause 
superfluous.
2. The Ninth & Tenth Amendments
The preceding discussion is mostly prologue to a discussion of rules of constitutional construction the 
Court may not ignore:  those imposed by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution.  The 
unenumerated rights doctrine, as enshrined in the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, provides a rule 
of construction that prohibits the Court’s suggested reading of the Due Process Clause in the BMW line of 
cases.  The Ninth Amendment states:  “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”230  This provision is meant to indicate that 
rights beyond those mentioned in the Constitution were retained by the people; thus, the fact that these 
retained rights are unenumerated may not be taken as a license to interpret the Constitution in a manner 
that offends them.  James Madison devised the amendment as a rule of construction that would protect 
against expansive interpretations of the Constitution that gave the national government the power to limit 
the rights of the states and their citizens in areas where the document failed to provide explicit protection.  
228 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989).
229
 I do not think such arguments are plausible; however, it is beyond the scope of this article to articulate a defense of the 
Court’s determination that punitive damages are not within the coverage of the Eighth Amendment.
230 U.S. CONST., amend IX.
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As one commentator explains, “Madison conceived the Ninth Amendment in response to calls from state 
conventions that a provision be added limiting the constructive expansion of federal power into matters 
properly belonging under state control.”231 As discussed further below, construing due process to 
empower the federal government to place substantive limits on the level of punitive damages that may be 
imposed by states is just such a “constructive expansion of federal power” into an area traditionally under 
state control.
The Tenth Amendment,232 a companion to the Ninth,233 compliments this rule of construction with an 
express declaration that the States have only given limited authority to the national government, retaining 
all other power and authority they otherwise held and failed to delegate.234  As James Madison explained, 
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to the several States will extend to 
all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the 
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.235
Justice Chase further explicated these principles on behalf of the Court in Calder v. Bull:236
It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several state legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to 
them by the state constitutions; which are not expressly taken away by the constitution of the United States.  The 
establishing courts of justice, the appointment of judges, and the making regulations for the administration of justice within 
each state, according to its laws, on all subjects not intrusted [sic] to the federal government, appears to me to be the peculiar 
231 See Lash, supra note 216 at 394.
232
 The Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST., amend. X.
233 See Lash, supra note 216 at 398 (“Other writers of the Founding generation joined Madison and Tucker in linking the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments as twin guardians of federalism.”).
234 JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTIONS CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 172 (De Capo Press 1970) (1820)  (“The 
states, instead of receiving, bestowed powers; and in confirmation of their authority, reserved every right they had not conceded, 
whether it is particularly enumerated, or tacitly retained.”).
235 The Federalist No. 45.  See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 176 
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (stating that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments ensure that “every state remains at full 
liberty to legislate upon the subject of rights, preferences, contracts, and remedies, as it may please”).
236 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
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and exclusive province and duty of the State Legislatures.  All the powers delegated by the people of the United States to the 
federal government are defined, and no constructive powers can be exercised by it.237
Thus, the clear office of the Tenth Amendment is to indicate that powers beyond those delegated to the 
national government may not be exercised by it, nor may provisions of the Constitution be construed in a 
manner that invests the federal government with undelegated powers reserved to the states.
Together, the Ninth Amendment, which guards “against a latitude of interpretation,”238 and the Tenth 
Amendment, which “exclud[es] every source of power not within the constitution itself,”239 combine to 
impose a “federalist rule of constitutional construction” that bars any interpretation of the Constitution 
that either infringes upon rights retained by the people or arrogates to the national government power 
reserved to the states.240  As St. George Tucker, a contemporary of the Founders, put it, “the powers 
delegated to the federal government, are, in all cases, to receive the most strict construction that the 
237 Id. at 387.
238 James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), in James Madison, Writings 
489 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). See also Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, Social Science 
Research Network Working Paper Series at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789384 (“[T]he Ninth Amendment . . . argues against a 
latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers.”).
239 Id.
240
 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The Persistent Quest for Certainty in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 641 (1997) (“[T]he Ninth and Tenth Amendments could be understood as complementary 
jurisdictional statements, together confirming that the states retained sovereign power over individual common law and state 
constitutional rights not enumerated in the Constitution, and that the federal government could exercise sovereign power only 
over those matters expressly delegated to it by the Constitution.”).  See also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text And Structure 
Seriously:  Reflections On Free-Form Method In Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1243 n.72 (1995) (“The 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments should caution us against ‘penumbral thinking’ with respect to grants of national government 
power.”).
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instrument will bear, where the rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individually, may 
be drawn in question.”241
The question then is whether the people, and derivatively the states, enjoyed a pre-constitutional (or a 
pre-Ninth and Tenth Amendment)242 right to impose exemplary or punitive damages awards on 
wrongdoers in an amount of their choosing.  It is clear that juries imposed damages exceeding the amount 
needed to compensate plaintiffs both prior to243 and after244 the adoption of the Constitution.  Such cases 
reflect a clear belief that where challenged conduct is found to have been particularly “wanton” or 
reprehensible, an exemplary award is in order.  The early New Jersey case of Coryell v. Colbaugh245 is 
particularly illustrative of this view.  After finding the defendant liable for breach of a promise to marry, 
we are told that the court instructed the jury as follows: 
The Chief Justice, in his charge to the jury, said that the injury complained of was of the most atrocious and dishonorable 
nature, and called for exemplary damages. That such conduct went to destroy the peace and prospects, not only of the 
injured woman, but to render families and parents wretched by the ruin of their children. He told the jury that they were not 
to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for example’s sake, to 
prevent such offences in future; and also to allow liberal damages for the breach of a sacred promise and the great 
disadvantages which must follow to her through life. That in this case they were to consider not only the past injury, but 
every consequence in future. He repeated in very strong terms his detestation of such conduct, and told the jury they were 
bound to no certain damages, but might give such a sum as would mark their disapprobation, and be an example to 
others.246
Joan v. Shield’s Lessee247 is in accord:
[T]he jury, who were respectable inhabitants of that county, were so well satisfied that the entry and ouster was so violent as 
to deserve exemplary damages, that they gave such as should deter others from such proceedings; they showed their 
detestation of the same, and gave damages accordingly. This will appear on viewing the quantity of land recovered. It 
could not be for any mesne profits, for they were insignificant, as nothing of that sort appears on the record, and the jury 
241 St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, App. 1, at 154 (St. George Tucker ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1803).
242
 The ten amendments of the Bill of Rights were ratified on December 15, 1791.
243 See, e.g., Genay v. Norris, (1 Bay 6 S.C. 1784).
244 See, e.g., Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 1791 WL 380, at *1 (1791).
245 1 N.J.L. 77 1791 WL 380, at *1 (1791).
246 Id. (emphasis added).
247 3 H. & McH. 7, 1790 WL 283, at *1 (Md. Gen. Oct. Term 1790).
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were the proper judges of the damages sustained by the entry and ouster; the law will always presume that what they have 
done is right.248
More recent recognition of the traditionally unconstrained authority of juries to impose punitive damages 
has already been referenced.249 It thus seems clear that the unconstrained authority of the people to 
impose punitive awards through juries is a pre-Ninth and -Tenth Amendment power not delegated to the 
federal government but retained by the people.
By interpreting the Due Process Clause in a manner that co-opts the authority of state juries to 
determine the appropriate level of punitive damages and permits the U.S. Supreme Court instead to 
declare what level of damages suffice, the Court has engaged in precisely the expansive and aggrandizing
interpretation of the Constitution prohibited by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  The Ninth 
Amendment is offended because interpreting due process as placing limits on the level of punitive 
damages that juries may award disparages the right retained by the people to determine the appropriate 
level themselves.  Even though no express provision of the Constitution protects the right of the people,
through juries, to award punitive damages in an amount of their choosing, no one has ever questioned that 
such a right was retained.250 Construing the Due Process Clause to limit this right by implication does the 
very thing the Ninth Amendment was designed to forbid:  it enables the Court to construe the Constitution 
in a manner that disparages clear retained rights. Thus, although it may at times be permissible to give a 
more expansive interpretation to a clause in the Constitution when that interpretation does not infringe 
clear rights retained by the people, when an interpretation would usurp such an indisputable and long-
248 Id. (emphasis added). 
249 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[P]unitive damages are not 
awarded within discernible limits but can be awarded in almost any amount.”); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 
521 (1885) (“The discretion of the jury in such cases is not controlled by any very definite rules.”).  
250 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“[N]othing is better settled than that . . . it is the peculiar function of the jury 
to determine the amount [of punitive damages] by their verdict.”); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852) (affirming the 
century-old principle that juries may impose punitive damages).
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standing principle such as the jury’s authority to impose punitive damages awards as they see fit, such an 
interpretation transgresses the text, meaning, and spirit of the Ninth Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment is offended for much the same reason:  prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution states had the authority to determine appropriate levels of punitive damages awards and no 
provision of that document delegates such authority to the national government.  Thus, the power is 
reserved to the states and the Court’s determination that it holds that power instead violates the Tenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of a federal government of limited, delegated powers.251 Indeed, the Court’s 
affront to the Tenth Amendment becomes more apparent when one considers the implications of allowing 
the Court to interpret the Constitution to give it a power not expressly delegated to the national 
government.  Under the Court’s view, if due process bars states from imposing punitive damages awards 
beyond a certain level, Congress could pass a statute—pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment252—declaring, for example, “No state may impose a punitive damages award 
greater than nine times the amount of compensatory damages.”  If the Court is right about the due process 
constraints on punitive damages, such a statute would be within Congress’s Section 5 enforcement 
authority, provided the legislation reached state action prohibited by the Due Process Clause or, if the 
legislation went beyond that scope, there was “proportionality or congruence between the means adopted 
and the legitimate end to be achieved.”253
251 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“[N]o one disputes the proposition that ‘[t]he Constitution created a 
Federal Government of limited powers.’”) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C. J.) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be 
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”).
252 U.S. CONST., amend XIV (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.”).
253 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997).  The Court has indicated that Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power is 
broad, and includes “the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by 
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text.”  
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But as discussed earlier,254 Congress does not possess—at least not by virtue of the Due Process 
Clause255—such authority over the common law practices of the states:
Should . . . the common law be held, like other laws, liable to revision and alteration, by the authority of Congress; it then 
follows, that the authority of Congress is co-extensive with the objects of common law; that is to say, with every object of 
legislation: For to every such object does some branch or other of the common law extend.  The authority of Congress 
would therefore be no longer under the limitations, marked out in the constitution.  They would be authorized to legislate in 
all cases whatsoever.256
Any interpretation of due process that would permit Congress to supplant state common law practices 
with its own common law preferences would be an interpretation at odds with the idea that the national 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004) (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)).  Justice Scalia 
has vigorously opposed the notion that Section 5 enforcement legislation may reach conduct not itself prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Lane, 541 U.S. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in § 5 allows Congress to go beyond the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or ‘remedy’ conduct that does not itself  violate any provision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
254 See supra TAN 201–203.
255
 The Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), indicates that Congress’s authority to regulate 
interstate commerce is broad enough to permit the regulation of wholly intrastate economic activity.  It is thus possible to 
imagine the Congress using its Commerce Clause power as interpreted in Raich to regulate punitive damages on the basis of their 
impact on interstate commerce, if one considered the imposition of punitive damages “economic activity.”  Indeed, the Court 
alluded to the interstate commerce concerns raised by high punitive damages awards.  See BMW, 517 U.S. at 585 (“Indeed, 
[BMW’s] status as an active participant in the national economy implicates the federal interest in preventing individual States 
from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce.”).  Congress has considered such legislation in the past, invoking its 
authority under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105th Cong. § 110 (1998) 
(proposing to establish a clear-and-convincing evidence rule and caps on punitive damage awards); Product Liability Reform Act 
of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. §  108 (1997) (proposing to cap punitive damage awards); H.R. 956, 104th Cong. §  2 (1995) 
(proposing to establish uniform legal standards and caps on punitive damage awards); H.R. 955, 104th Cong. §  8(A)-(B) (1995) 
(proposing to establish a clear-and-convincing evidence rule and caps on punitive damage awards).  Whether Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power would indeed permit it to limit punitive damages awards imposed by states is a matter beyond the scope 
of this Article.
256 See James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in James Madison, Writings 639 (Jack N. 
Rakove ed., 1999).
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government is one of limited authority.  That, however, is what the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence 
does.  The Court has given itself—and presumably the Congress via its Section 5 enforcement 
authority—power that no provision of the Constitution delegates to the federal government:  the power to 
determine what level of punitive damages is sufficient to achieve states’ goals of punishment and 
deterrence.
Finally, it must be noted that the force of the Seventh Amendment strengthens the arguments made 
under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments above in that it expressly preserves the right of trial by jury as it 
existed prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights at common law, rendering constructive limitations on 
jury discretion even more suspect.  The Seventh Amendment provides, in part, “In Suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . 
.”
257 At the time of the Founding, the civil jury was a revered institution that was seen as a guard against 
the excesses of governmental authority and oppression. The importance of the civil jury to American 
colonists is most exemplified by the closely-followed English case of Wilkes v. Wood.258  Wilkes, an 
outspoken Member of Parliament who spoke out in favor of the rights of American colonists,259 had been 
wrongfully arrested for his critical remarks Lord Halifax and brought suit against the Crown in response.  
The jury awarded Wilkes 1,000, an amount the Crown argued was vastly in excess of Wilkes’ actual 
damages.  Rejecting this challenge, Lord Chief Justice Pratt wrote, “[A] jury shall have it in their power 
to give damages for more than the injury received as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such 
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.”260 This 
authority of civil juries to impose exemplary damages as a means of punishing the guilty and deterring 
other similar conduct carried over into the colonies where the institution of the jury became critical to 
257 U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
258 Lofft 1, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763)
259 See generally RAYMOND W. POSTGATE, THAT DEVIL WILKES (1929); GEORGE F.E. RUDE, WILKES AND LIBERTY (1962).
260 Wilkes, 98 Eng.Rep. 489, 498– 99.
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protecting colonists against excesses of the Crown.261 The Crown’s interference with the authority of the 
jury was “one of the important grievances leading to the break with England” and a key impetus behind 
the development and ratification of the Seventh Amendment.262
The right of juries to impose punitive damages was thus clearly an important component of the 
common law and should be treated as an element of the right of trial by jury that the Seventh Amendment 
preserved.  However, even if one were not inclined to inculcate the Seventh Amendment’s jury 
protections with any particular respect for the unconstrained discretion of juries to impose punitive 
awards, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments verify that the right of the people through juries to impose 
punitive awards—and states’ exclusive authority over this sphere—cannot be constructively read out of 
the Constitution and placed in the hands of the national government.  To do so would impermissibly alter 
the architecture of the governmental structure established by the Constitution,263 a national government of 
limited and delegated powers balanced by states that retained their pre-existing undelegated powers and 
by the authority o f the civil jury as it existed at common law.264  Disrupting this balance by permitting the 
261
 White, supra note 179 at 83.
262 Id. at 83–84 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
263
 I borrow the concept of the “architecture” of our constitutionally established structure of government from Professor Tribe.  
He asserts that the text of the Constitution “does indeed define an architecture—a connected structure rather than simply a 
sequence of directives, powers, and prohibitions” and thus requires interpreters of the document to “take structure as well as text 
seriously.”  Tribe, supra note 240 at 1236.  To do so, Tribe states, “one must attend to the ‘topology’ of the edifice—those 
fundamental features that define how its components interlock and that identify the basic geometry of their interconnected 
composition.”  Id.
264
 It would not be too far fetched to note that the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government for each of the 
states, see U.S. CONST., Art. IV, in conjunction with the various constitutional guarantees of jury trials, also contributes to this 
architecture, guaranteeing that within the states, each citizen will be an important component of the political decision-making 
process—both as voters and jurors—thereby “safeguard[ing] liberty to ensure that never again will the people of this country be 
under the heel of a tyrant.”  Charles I. Lugosi, Reflections from Embassy Lakes, Florida: The Effective Teaching Of Criminal 
Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1337, 1348 (2004).  Justice Breyer would likely describe this state of popular sovereignty and political 
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federal government to invade the traditional province of the civil jury by constraining and second-
guessing its discretion gives the national government power over the states and the people that the 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments must be viewed as having been designed to forbid.
In sum, although the Court is the ultimate expositor of the meaning of the Constitution, it is 
constrained in how it may construe provisions of that document.  Key among those constraints are that 
retained, though unenumerated, rights may not be abridged through constructive implication and that 
powers not expressly delegated to the national government may not be expropriated by implication when 
they have been reserved to the states, particularly in view of the Seventh Amendment’s express 
protections for the institution and authority of the civil jury.  By failing to hold itself to these limitations 
on its interpretive authority, the Court has threatened the notion of a limited federal government265 and 
has used the Due Process Clause as a “pretext . . . for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the 
government.”266
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Having now thoroughly critiqued the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence as being rooted in an 
unprecedented, untenable, and impermissible construction of the Due Process Clause, it now remains to 
determine what constraints, if any, the Constitution does place on the award of punitive damages. Due 
process has a role to play with respect to punitive damages awards, but it is drastically more limited than 
the Court would have it.  Defendants certainly are entitled to be on notice regarding what conduct will 
lead to what type of consequences.  Further, defendants do deserve protection against arbitrary exercises 
engagement as part of his notion of “active liberty,” which he defines as “a sharing of a nation’s sovereign authority among that 
nation’s citizens,” involving citizens in “an active and constant participation in collective power” including the rights of public 
deliberation, voting, and holding wrongdoers accountable for their misdeeds.  STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 4 (KNOPF 
2005).
265
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, 
is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed.”).
266
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819).
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of state power.  But the Due Process Clause fails to suggest that there should be any numerical or 
proportionality limitations on the actual size of punitive awards.  It is for states to determine how 
reprehensible various categories of offenses are to state interests when they authorize punitive damages to 
be imposed and for juries and state courts to determine reprehensibility and desert in particular cases.  In 
this Part, this Article proposes a framework of constitutional constraints on the award of punitive damages 
more in line with the Constitution than the excessiveness jurisprudence of the Court.
A. Culpability beyond Simple Negligence
The starting point for scrutinizing punitive damages is the legitimate goals of the state that they seek 
to promote:  punishment and deterrence.  The Supreme Court has recognized these goals as legitimate 
state interests that states may rightly pursue through the imposition of punitive damages awards.267  Thus, 
if punitive damages are imposed in instances where punishment and deterrence goals are not implicated, 
state power creeps into a sphere of arbitrariness that notions of due process rightly forbid.  
How can there be an objective, principled determination of instances in which the state’s legitimate 
goals of punishment and deterrence are not implicated?  At the very least, when negligent conduct is at 
issue, it is difficult to argue that punishment beyond full victim compensation is in order given the 
unintentional nature of the actions in question.  Similarly, deterrence objectives are not significantly 
implicated in the face of negligent conduct because the conduct at issue is accidental rather than 
intentional, meaning that the simple encouragement of the exercise of due care is needed rather than the 
discouragement of conscious wrongdoing.  Most persons are chastened to exercise sufficient care to avoid 
accidental harms simply by the fact that they will bear the cost of any harm their negligence might 
cause.268 It thus appears that the imposition of punitive damages on tortfeasors liable for simple 
267 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing 
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”).
268
 Although insurance coverage can mitigate the costs borne by negligent tortfeasors, it does not necessarily eliminate all 
costs.  For example, one responsible for a car accident may have the tab picked up by his or her insurer, but the insurer typically 
will raise the insured’s premiums in response, imposing a direct—though lower—cost on the responsible party.
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negligence would be unconnected with the pursuit of a state’s interests in punishment and deterrence, 
which in turn would render a punitive award this context an arbitrary exercise of state power.  
As such, the Due Process Clause rightly should be viewed as prohibiting the imposition of punitive 
damages in cases involving simple negligence.269  Stated differently, due process requires that punitive 
damages be reserved for culpability beyond simple negligence, which would include instances of repeated 
negligence by the same actor.270  This limitation is consistent with the tradition of punitive damages in 
this country and in England.271 States already require heightened culpability to impose punitive damages 
awards,272 making this limitation a background requirement that the Supreme Court should not find itself 
needing to enforce.
269
 I speak here only of the limitations imposed by due process.  The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment 
requires heightened culpability when imposing punishment against publishers found to have defamed private individuals.  Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (holding that in defamation suits by private individuals against publishers or 
broadcasters “the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a 
showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth”).
270 Carruthers v. Tillman, 2 N.C. 501, 1797 WL 197 at *1 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1797) (“[I]t is not proper in the first instance 
[of a nuisance] to give exemplary damages, but such only as will compensate for actual loss . . . . [B]but if after this the nuisance 
should be continued, and a new action brought, then the damages should be so exemplary as to compel an abatement of the 
nuisance.”).
271 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (“[I]n England and in this country [damages] have been 
allowed in excess of compensation, whenever malice, gross neglect, or oppression has caused or accompanied the commission of 
the injury complained of.”); Emblen v. Myers, 158 Eng.Rep. 23 (1860) (holding that in an action for wilful negligence, the jury 
may take into consideration the motives of the defendant, and if the negligence is accompanied with a contempt of the plaintiff’s 
rights and convenience, the jury may give exemplary damages). 
272 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (requiring clear and convincing evidence of “oppression, fraud, or malice” to support an 
award of exemplary damages”); Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. 2005) (“[I]n Pennsylvania, a 
punitive damages claim must be supported by evidence sufficient to establish that (1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of 
the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to act, as the case may be, in conscious 
disregard of that risk.”); Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Wis. 2005) (“Punitive 
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B. Jury Discretion Constrained by the Goals of Punishment & Deterrence
Next, because states may only impose punitive damages in pursuit of the goals of punishment and 
deterrence, juries must be instructed to constrain their award to the minimum level that in their view 
would further those goals.  The punitive award must at least purport to be one that is derived with 
reference to promoting the legitimate goals of punishment and deterrence that a state may pursue.  A 
punitive damages award becomes arbitrary if it is imposed without an eye towards these objectives.  Thus, 
state law providing for punitive damages must require courts to instruct juries to impose an amount based 
on the jurors’ views of what is needed to achieve these goals. That means that jurors must be instructed 
that they should not include within a punitive damages award any amount intended to compensate the 
plaintiff for any injury.  Additionally, jurors must be instructed that they may not be moved by bias or 
prejudice in calculating a proper punitive damages award but must focus solely on determining an amount 
that would suffice to punish the wrongdoing adequately and to deter others from behaving similarly in the 
future.273
C. No Improper Consideration of Out-of-State Conduct
The Court has properly indicated that the limits of state sovereignty preclude states from punishing
defendants for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred or from using their laws to impose 
damages are not recoverable if a wrongdoer's conduct is merely negligent.  Only when the wrongdoer’s conduct is so aggravated 
that it meets the elevated standard of an ‘intentional disregard of rights’ should a circuit court send the issue of punitive damages
to a jury.”); Bell v. Heitkamp, Inc., 728 A.2d 743, 752 (Md. App. 1999) (“[F]acts showing actual malice must be pleaded, and if 
the case goes to trial, plaintiff must prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.”); Preston v. Murty, 
512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987) (“We therefore hold that actual malice, necessary for an award of punitive damages, is (1) 
that state of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious 
disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.”).
273 Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989) (“[I]t is not disputed that a jury 
award may not be upheld if it was the product of bias or passion.”).
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punitive damages for unlawful out-of-state conduct.274  However, the Court has also affirmed that out-of-
state conduct that provides evidence of defendants’ culpability and intent respecting their actions against 
plaintiffs may be considered by juries.275  Juries must be informed of these limitations and instructed to 
punish only the conduct of defendants vis-à-vis their respective plaintiffs, not broader conduct affecting 
others elsewhere.   
D. Meaningful Trial Court Scrutiny & Appellate Review
Although jurors need to be told to constrain their award to an amount no greater than needed to 
achieve the state’s legitimate goals, it is always possible that they will miss the mark in that regard.  In 
such an event, any amount of the punitive award beyond that needed to achieve the state’s legitimate 
goals would constitute an “erroneous deprivation,” to use the language of Mathews v. Eldridge.276 As a 
result, to ensure that a punitive damages award is limited to an amount sufficient to achieve punishment 
and deterrence, meaningful and adequate review of jury awards by trial court judges and state appellate 
courts must be available.  Review by the trial court should simply verify that the jury had before it facts 
that would support the jury’s award with reference to factors such as the actual level of the defendant’s
culpability, the intent of the defendant, the state’s interest in deterring others from similar conduct and 
protecting the public from such wrongdoing, the impact of conduct on the victim and others, the 
defendant’s wealth, and any mitigating circumstances. Trial courts must also make certain that the jury 
did not seek to punish out-of-state conduct through its award, which can be addressed both through proper 
jury instructions to that effect and upon review of the award.
274 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421; BMW, 517 U.S. at 572.
275 See BMW, 517 U.S at 574 n.21 (indicating that “evidence describing out-of-state transactions” “may be relevant to the 
determination of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct”).  See also id. at 603 (“But if a person has been held 
subject to punishment because he committed an unlawful act, the degree of his punishment assuredly can be increased on the 
basis of any other conduct of his that displays his wickedness, unlawful or not.  Criminal sentences can be computed, we have 
said, on the basis of ‘information concerning every aspect of a defendant’s life.’”) (citation omitted).
276 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) .
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State appellate review must also be available not only as a check on the trial court’s validation of a 
jury award, but also to check for intra-system consistency between a given award and others imposed 
under similar circumstances.  If similarly situated defendants are facing wildly divergent punitive 
damages awards within a state’s judicial system, the state’s exercise of its power to impose such damages 
begins to appear to be arbitrary.  Although no two cases will have identical facts and thus some variance 
in punitive awards is to be expected, similar offences under similar circumstances warrant similar 
punishment.  This cannot be a rigid requirement; where facts and circumstances warranting a departure 
from the typical punitive award are identified, a state appellate court may properly endorse the award 
without rendering the state’s punitive damages regime arbitrary.  However, an unexplained or 
unwarranted departure is constitutionally problematic because it suggests that the award exceeds the 
amount deemed in other similar cases to be sufficient to achieve the state’s legitimate goals, rendering the 
award in question arbitrary in the manner described above.277
What is required by due process here is that states have in place a process whereby judicial review of 
jury awards is available and undertaken with an eye towards ensuring that punitive damages awards are 
limited to an amount that furthers the goals of punishment and deterrence and that the award is broadly 
consistent with awards imposed under similar circumstances.  However, the judgment as to whether a 
given award is commensurate with the furtherance of the state’s legitimate goals and consistent with other 
awards is for juries and state courts to make.  As discussed above, due process does not require or permit 
federal courts to make these determinations.  Thus, once the state’s highest court has weighed in on the 
matter, their determination regarding the propriety of the award is final, provided the procedural 
protections outlined above have been respected.  In the end, then, the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
review would be limited to assuring that these constitutionally required procedures are respected, with no 
authority to revisit the state’s determination that an award of a given amount is appropriate.
277 See supra Part III.B.1.
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CONCLUSION
The task of courts with respect to the Constitution is—to the extent possible—to give its passages a 
meaning consistent with what their texts meant at the time they were drafted and adopted rather than what 
judges might like them to mean today,278 making certain, however, that the interpretation is consistent 
with other provisions of the document and the overall structure of government the Constitution creates.  
Concocting constitutional limitations that the text fails to reveal or support, and that history fails to 
endorse, is not the product of judicial interpretation, but of judicial creation.279 If the Court perceives 
there to be a substantive legal protection that members of our polity should have, it should limit itself to 
noting the gap and suggesting that appropriate political bodies (Congress and state legislatures) attend to 
the matter. This admonition is particularly apropos when dealing with the Due Process Clause; as the 
Court long ago rightly observed:
The due process clause does not impose upon the States a duty to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice 
. . . . However desirable it is that the old forms of procedure be improved with the progress of time, it cannot rightly be said 
that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a universal and self-executing remedy.   Its function is negative, not affirmative, 
and it carries no mandate for particular measures of reform.280
Thus, although punitive damages reform might be a legitimate policy objective, using the Due Process 
Clause to achieve it cannot plausibly be condoned in light of the historical understanding of the clause or
the Court’s broader modern-day due process jurisprudence.  Neither can such use of the clause be 
defended in view of states’ traditional, undelegated authority to fix and impose punitive damages and 
those constitutional rules of construction that bar constructive disparagement of that authority.
278
 Of course, the effort to discern the original meaning of constitutional provisions is not a simple or precise endeavor.  See 
Scalia, supra note 151 at 45 (“There is plenty of room for disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to 
how that original meaning applies to the situation before the court.”).
279 Cf. id. at 18 (describing the “legislative intent” approach to statutory interpretation as “a handy cover for judicial intent”); 
Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in Scalia, supra note 151 at 108 (describing the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s as “creative judicial elaboration”).
280 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110–12 (1921).
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Beyond the historical and doctrinal difficulties with the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence, one may 
marvel at how odd it is for the Court ardently to impose prohibitions against punitive dollar awards
beyond a certain amount while it freely permits states to imprison petty repeat offenders to life 
imprisonment.281  On the one hand, the Constitution explicitly proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” 
but the Court finds no obstacle therein to the imposition of our society’s penultimate penal sanction—
endless imprisonment—for petty but recidivist thieves.282  On the other hand, the Constitution says 
nothing about a bar against excessive punitive damages but the Court bends over backwards to twist the 
document in a manner that regards monetary sanctions beyond single-digit multiples as breathtaking, 
eyebrow-raising affronts to our constitutional sensibilities that must be combated.  From the outside 
looking in, one would gaze upon such a state of affairs and conclude that the Court cares more about 
protecting businesses against high-dollar payouts than it does about protecting individual convicts from
draconian measures that leave them languishing in prison for the rest of their lives.  I am certain that such 
is hardly the case; however, one must wonder why no judicial eyebrows are raised on behalf of these 
unfortunate lifers in the face of Eighth Amendment protections that one might have thought were in place 
to offer these souls some relief.
281
 Other commentators have made a similar observation.  See Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, Punitive Damages, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 317, 326 (2003) (“[F]rom a purely doctrinal perspective, the Court’s treatment of punitive damages in State Farm 
is in tension with its treatment of criminal sentences last Term in Ewing v. California, in which it upheld a sentence of twenty-
five years to life imprisonment imposed under California’s ‘Three Strikes’ law on a defendant who shoplifted $1200 worth of 
golf clubs.”).  See also Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 699 n.102 
(2005) (“The Court’s proportionality jurisprudence looks even more incoherent if we keep in mind the much-noted tension 
between the Court's general reluctance in the Eighth Amendment proportionality cases and its relatively enthusiastic embrace of 
proportionality regulation of punitive damages under the Due Process Clause, an article-length topic in its own right.”).
282 See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding that a life sentence imposed after only a third nonviolent felony 
conviction did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).  See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 
U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (holding that imposition of life sentence for petty thief was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 
the clearly established gross disproportionality principle set forth by the decisions of Court).
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What is good for the goose should be good for the gander:  If the express protection against “cruel 
and unusual” punishments fails to constrain states from permanently locking up petty recidivists, then the 
authority of states to impose stiff punitive damages awards should not be deemed to be limited in the 
absence of any express (or plausibly implicit) provision to that effect.  Life imprisonment for petty repeat 
offenders might be viewed by many as excessive or “unusual” in that it is a greater penalty than needed to 
achieve the state’s legitimate goals of punishment and deterrence; however, the Court has not seen fit to 
second-guess those states that see matters differently.  The Court should similarly refrain from second-
guessing state judgments regarding proper levels of punitive damages awards.
In any event, punitive damages awards that are the product of the process suggested in this Article 
have given defendants their due.  A defendant who has chosen to act in a jurisdiction with given standards 
for awarding punitive damages, who has failed to convince a jury and/or a trial judge that no award or a 
lower one would be more appropriate, and who has failed to convince state appellate courts that the 
standards for imposing such awards were neglected in some way has no recourse to the federal 
Constitution to challenge what has occurred as a transgression of due process.  To the contrary, the threat 
of such damages in that event would have been clear and the courts of the state would have provided 
review sufficient to ensure that the jury was not wildly off the mark in selecting a given amount. States, 
through the apparatus of the legislature, the civil jury, and the state judiciary, should be left free to make
the determination that the challenged conduct of the defendant warrants a particular level of approbation 
reflected in an approved punitive award.  No principle of federal constitutional law presently steps in to 
scrutinize that ultimate conclusion.  The Court should abandon its present course and set right the 
doctrinal damage it has done.
